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Faculty and Deans

MISTAKING MARRIAGE FOR SOCIAL POLICY

Vivian Hamilton 1

This Article examines the role of marriage in society, focusing
on the state's use of marriage as a proxy for desirable outcomes
in social policy. Its analytical point of departure is the
normative vision of modern marriage embraced by many of its
proponents. From there, the idealized marriage is analyzed, not
as a monolithic, opaque institution, but as one whose functional
components may be identified and examined. The Article
identifies the following as the primary functions of the normative
marital family: expression; companionship; sex/procreation;
caretaking; and economic support or redistribution. Analyzing
the roles in society of each of these functions, it concludes that:
(1) the expressive and companionate functions of marriage
provide no societal benefit sufficient to justify state interference
in those functions; (2) its purely sexual and procreative functions
merit privacy and should, in all respects, be treated no
differently than nonmarital sex and procreation; but (3) its
caretaking and economic support functions benefit society
significantly. Indeed, here the state's interest is at its apex.
Accordingly, direct support of these two closely related
functions, rather than the crude proxy ofmarriage in its entirety,
should be the focus of state social policy in this area.

I. INTRODUCTION

We are at a crossroads. The Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence
v. Texas 2 has cast further doubt on the already-questioned Defense of
Director, Women & the Law Clinic, American University Washington College of
Law. For their generous and insightful comments on earlier drafts, I thank Ann
Shalleck, Nancy Polikoff, Elizabeth Bruch, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, John
Frankenhoff, Martha Fineman and participants in the Cornell Feminist Legal Theory
Workshop held at the University of Wisconsin. I am grateful to Pamela Bridgewater and
Darren Hutchinson for supporting my work. I also thank Traci Hale, Danielle Hayot,
Teresa Rogers, and Andrew Stawar for their capable research assistance.
2 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003). In Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain
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Marriage Act ("DOMA"), 3 as well as the laws of every state excluding
same-sex couples from marrying. Debate about a possible constitutional
amendment to ban gay marriage has led to President Bush throwing his
support behind the idea.4 The argument, of course, rages on. On one
side, there are impassioned defenses of marriage as it currently exists in
the U.S.; on the other, equally impassioned attacks on the institution as
traditionally conceived. Yet the history and laws of the United States
reflect a national commitment to heterosexual monogamy.5 And this
commitment is about more than just favoring one type of marriage over
alternative forms. Marriage itself is seen as a tool to ensure the wellbeing of families and children, and federal and state family policies
continue to rely heavily on it to do so.6 That social policy is expressed
intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional as applied to adult males who had engaged
in consensual acts of sodomy in the privacy of the home. Overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the U.S. Constitution provides no
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy), the Court acknowledged that
individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical relationships are a form of
liberty, and hence, the Texas statute impinged on the exercise of liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 123 S.Ct. at 2484.
In its rationale, the Court cited an "emerging awareness" in the Nation's laws and
traditions over the past half century that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. /d. at
2480.
3 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2004). DOMA defines marriage for purposes of federal law to
include "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife" and
defines "spouse" as "only a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." It
seeks to relieve states of the obligation to recognize same-sex marriages contracted in
any other state. Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence, the Act's
constitutionality was the subject of vigorous debate. For articles attacking the
constitutionality of the Act, see, e.g., James M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional
Establishment of Fundamentalist Christianity, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 335 (1997);
Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REv. I (1997); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of
Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REv.
1435 (1997). For articles defending the Act, see, e.g. David Orgon Coolidge & William
C. Duncan, Reaffirming Marriage: A Presidential Priority, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y
623 (200 1); Daniel Crane, The Original Understanding of the "Effects Clause" of
Article IV. Section 1, and Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 6 GEO. MASON
L. REv. 307 (1998); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 255 (1998).
4 President George W . Bush, Announcement in the White House Roosevelt Room
~Feb. 24, 2004) (transcribed by FDCH E-Media).
See generally MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 64-152 (1985). See also June Carbone, Morality,
Public Policy and the Family: The Role of Marriage and the Public/Private Divide, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267, 269-71 (1996).
6 See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 5, at 269-70:
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through legislation.? Marriage is proposed and accepted (so to speak) by
lawmakers as a proxy for socially desirable outcomes. The federal
The first question is whether the United States has, or, indeed, has ever
had a family policy as such ... [W]hen the public and private spheres
are considered together, a fairly clear family policy does emerge, at
least in hindsight. U.S. law, policy, and social mores have long focused
on an overwhelming, some would argue exclusive, emphasis on
traditional marriage as the only legitimate locus of childrearing. Within
this system, the state has regulated marriage, divorce, the status of
children, and the fmancial consequences of these relationships, but state
responsibility for children's well-being has been largely discharged with
the creation and maintenance of the marital union.
/d. at 269 (internal citations omitted). See also Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family,
8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 197-99 (1999) ("Under our federalist system, the axiom
has it, family law resides within the province of the states . .. As a factual matter,
however, the federal government exerts tremendous power over family.").
1 See infra notes 187-194 and accompanying text for a discussion of the myriad
benefits that accompany married status. The federal income tax system, however, is one
of the few places where marriage is only inconsistently rewarded. William Galston notes
that currently, joint returns for married couples combine with progressive marginal rates
to reduce the income tax liability of some married couples but increase the tax liability of
others. William Galston, Observations on Some Proposals to Help Parents: A
Progressive Perspective, in TAKING PARENTING PUBLIC: THE CASE FOR A NEW SOCIAL
MOVEMENT 155, 162 (Hewlett, Rankin, & West, eds., 2002). Nonetheless, slightly more
couples receive a marriage bonus than pay a marriage penalty. See CoNGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BEITER OR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1
(1997). The Congressional Budget Office study found that in 1996, 25 million married
couples had their income tax liabilities reduced by $33 billion, while more than 21
million couples paid $29 billion more in federal income tax than they would if they were
unmarried. !d. But as the proportion of two-earner couples with comparable incomes
increases, so too will the proportion of married couples paying a marriage penalty. See
Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REv. 1, 6-7 (2000).
The joint return system treats married couples as single economic units, combining their
income in the joint return. But because the joint return rate schedule consists of brackets
that are wider than the brackets for single taxpayers but less than twice as wide, some
couples receive marriages bonuses while others pay marriage penalties. See Lawrence
Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339, 340-42 (1994). Twoearner couples with comparable incomes suffer a marriage penalty because they are
pushed into tax brackets higher than they would be in if they were filing separately.
Married workers with nonearning spouses (or spouses with significantly lower earnings),
on the other hand, receive a marriage bonus and have lower tax liability than single,
equal earning workers. The current system thus arguably creates an incentive for
couples to conform to the single- or primary-earner family model. See EDWARD J.
MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 11-28 {1997); Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax,
supra at 343. For a concise and accessible explanation of the marriage " penalty" and
"bonus", see Richard B. Malamud, Allocation of the Joint Return Marriage Penalty and
Bonus, 15 VA. TAX REV. 489,491-93 (1996).
Some argue that the penalty that affects some couples dissuades couples from marrying.
See, e.g., id. at 493; MICHAELl. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX
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government explicitly embraced marriage as a facet of antipoverty
policy when it enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA"). PRWORA,
among other things, designates public monies to encourage poor women
to marry. 8 That same year, congressional enactment of DOMA allowed
for the policing of public morality with respect to marriage by permitting
states to refuse to give legal effect to same-sex marriages recognized by
other states. 9
This is clearly a time of legislative and cultural ferment on the issue
of marriage and the state's use of it as a tool of social policy, so it is
appropriate to evaluate both. In doing so, I operate from the premise
that bare public morality ought not be the sole justification for public
policy or state action. Public morality, without more, is not necessarily
connected to the public welfare.
Peter Cicchino, echoing and
elaborating on the work of John Stuart Mill, argues that the state should
not prohibit private conduct that does not injure third parties solely

29-40 ( 1997). But the existence of a marriage penalty for some couples seems to have
had little or no effect on the marriage rate. See, e.g., David L. Sjoquist & Mary Beth
Walker, The Marriage Tax and the Rate and Timing of Marriage, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 547
(1995) (reporting no effect of the marriage penalty on female marriage rates); James Aim
& Leslie A. Whittington, Does the Income Tax Affect Marital Decisions? 48 NAT'L TAX
J. 565 (1995) (reporting that the marriage penalty has an impact, albeit a small one, on
marriage rates). The likely reason is that other economic, legal, and social benefits of
marriage far outweigh the costs imposed by an income tax penalty. See, e.g., Robert S.
Mcintyre & Michael J. Mcintyre, Fixing the "Marriage Penalty" Problem, 33 VAL. U.L.
REv. 907, 912 (1999). Mcintyre & Mcintyre surmise that "[t]he collateral effects of
marriage and divorce apparently are sufficiently important to married couples that they
are unwilling to change their marital status simply to gain . . . tax benefits". !d.
8 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-617 (2004); llO Stat. 2105, 2113-34 (1996). The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 replaced the earlier
public assistance program, Aid to Families With Dependent Children, Social Security
Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 401, 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1935); Social Security
Amendments of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-880, § 312, 70 Stat. 807, 848-49 (1956); Public
Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § I 04, 76 Stat. 172, 185-86 (1962);
Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 241, 81 Stat. 821, 916
(1968), with the new Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF"). PRWORA
also revised many other federal initiatives by making changes to programs that included
food stamps, child support, aid for disabled children, and child care. !d. One of the
stated purposes of the legislation is "to end dependency of needy parents on government
benefits by promoting job preparation, work and marriage." Id. at§ 60l(a)(2). The Act
funds state programs designed to encourage marriage and two-parent families, and is so
broadly worded that the programs need not be targeted exclusively to needy families, but
can instead aim to reach non-needy families as well.
9 1 U.S.C.A. § 7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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because that conduct violates majoritarian morality.IO I extend that
argument. Not only should the state refrain from prohibiting such
conduct, but it also should avoid promoting certain sorts of private
conduct based largely on moral considerations-particularly, conduct
that goes to the core of self-definition and identity. Within this core
reside the proper nature and structure of intimate relationships between
adults. State involvement in these areas distorts preferences; the more
''private" the area, the more the state should be aware of and restrain-or
entirely abstain from using-its coercive power.
This Article explores the role of marriage and the marital family in
society by dismantling the normative marital relationship 11 into its
functional parts and examining each separately. When government
promotes marriage through legislation, it promotes all that the institution
entails, suggesting that marriage itself promotes the public welfare. I
argue that the institution of marriage is not monolithic; instead, the
normative marital relationship can be viewed as a composite whose
primary functions may be identified and systematically analyzed.
Litigants and academics have employed functional approaches to the
family in order to obtain for alternative families benefits usually
reserved for marital families. A functional approach typically questions
whether an unconventional relationship shares the essential
characteristics of a traditionally accepted relationship; if so, the
10

See Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of
"Public Morality" QualifY as Legitimate Government Interests for the Purposes of
Equal Protection Review? 87 GEO. L.J. 139 (1998). Cicchino focuses on governmental
laws that discriminate against people on the basis of their sexual orientation. His
analysis is grounded in constitutional equal protection jurisprudence, and he argues that
"a bare assertion of public morality provides no 'rational basis' for a law because such
assertions, unsupported by any observable connection to the public welfare, are not
themselves rational." Id. at 142. See also. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2480
(2003), quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992) ("The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce [the
view that homosexuality is wrong] on the whole society through operation of the
criminal law. 'Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code."'); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (J. Stevens, dissenting)
("[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from
constitutional attack."); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 80-81 (David Bromnich &
George Kateb eds., 2003).
11 By this, I mean the idealized vision of the marital family espoused by many of its
proponents. See infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
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argument goes, the unconventional relationship should receive
equivalent benefits or privileges. 12 This Article, however, will use this
approach differently. Just as it is useful in the contexts of litigation and
academia to unbundle marriage, this unbundling could also be an apt
tool in the creation of policy and legislation. I suggest that makers of
social policy use the diffracting lens of a functional approach to examine
marriage and the marital family to disaggregate and then better
understand its various components before adopting marriage as a
solution to social ills.
Part II of this Article briefly reviews several prominent theories of
modem marriage. 13 First, it describes what is often referred to as the
"traditional" family 14-the two-parent household where the partners'
roles complement each other. The husband focuses on his career and
providing income to the household, the wife subordinates her career (or
abandons the workplace altogether) to become the family's primary
caretaker and otherwise meet the household's needs. Second, it
discusses the liberal feminist vision of the 'egalitarian' family-where
the husband and wife share income earning, childrearing, and household
chores. This part concludes by discussing a feminist critique, led by
Martha Fineman, of the modern and liberal feminist visions of the
egalitarian family. That critique takes the view that it is not enough to
examine inequality within the family.
Instead, Fineman urges
reexamination of the centrality in society of the nuclear family itself.
Part III attempts the sort of reexamination that Fineman favors by
exploring the marital family's dominant role in society. It proposes a
diffracting functional approach as a framework through which a
12

Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits ofthe Functional Approach to
the Legal Definition of Family, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1640, 1646-47 (1991). Several
commentators have identified problems with adopting an approach that uses the
'traditional' family as a reference point; I discuss this and other limitations of the
functional approach in Part II.A. See infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 17-46 and accompanying text.
14 Historians have noted that the "popular image of what families were supposed to be
like (is] by no means a correct recollection of any actual 'traditional' family." JUDITH
STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKlNG FAMILY VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN

AGE 6 (1996) (internal citations omitted). They and others who write about the family
thus use "the concept of the modern family to designate a family form that most
Americans now consider to be traditional ... [T]he term postmodern family instead .. .
signal[s] the contested, ambivalent, and undecided character of our contemporary family
cultures." /d. at 6-7 (emphasis added). For accuracy, I will use the term "modern
family" when discussing that family form. For clarity, I will occasionally call it the "socalled traditional family".
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reexamination of marriage and the marital family's role in society should
occur. 15 First, the more familiar functional form of analysis is discussed.
This familiar form presumes that social regulation of the family arises
from the state's interest in the various functions the family performs in
society. Indeed, those who have relied on this approach have urged that
nontraditional intimate groupings be recognized as "families" when they
perform functions analogous to those of the so-called traditional family.
Part III then proceeds to describe a revised functional theory that
dissects the functions performed by normative marriage-that idealized
vision of matrimony imagined by its proponents, the most prominent of
whom may be Nobel laureate economist Gary Becker. 16 Through the
diffracting lens of this revised functional approach, normative marriage
is seen to perform the following primary societal tasks: expression,
companionship, sex and procreation, caretaking, and economic
support/redistribution. An examination of state marital activism ought
not focus solely on marriage as an imagined monolith, but instead on
this more complicated, unbundled view of the institution as composed of
numerous functional elements that contribute in multiple ways to its
ultimate operation.
I then analyze each of marriage's functions separately. The analyses
seek to reconcile a rights-based approach that recognizes individuals'
privacy, autonomy, and/or dependency, with an overarching approach to
social policy that acknowledges a greater societal interest in and
responsibility for ensuring the social welfare.
I conclude that its expressive and companionate functions do not
benefit society sufficiently to justify state involvement. The purely
sexual/procreative function, like the sexual and procreative decisions of
unmarried adults, merits privacy. State involvement in these familial
functions may unnecessarily dictate the content of individuals'
expression, distort their freedom to choose the nature of their intimate
associations and personal commitments, and excessively involve the
state in private sexual and procreative decisions.
On the other hand, two of marriage's functions--dependent
caretaking and economic support and redistribution-provide
tremendous societal benefit.
Indeed, the state's interest in and
15

16

See infra notes 54-250 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
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responsibility for ensuring the public welfare not only merit state
support of these functions, they require it. But caregiving and economic
support benefit society whether performed within or outside of the
marital relationship.
Government should therefore refrain from
promoting marriage and instead enact better-targeted and more efficient
policies to directly support these important societal functions.

II. THEORIES OF MODERN AND POSTMODERN MARRIAGE 17

A. The Modern Family
As mentioned above, the classic theory of the modem family has
been expressed most prominently by economist Gary Becker. Although
he initially published A Treatise on the Family more than twenty years
ago, 18 his vision of the specialized two-parent family continues to be
both cited explicitly and relied upon implicitly by modem proponents of
this family structure. 19 In his treatise, Becker argues that the division of
labor by gender within marriage is efficient and thus properly the central
feature of family life. 20 He posits a series of theorems to describe the
two types of activity-market work and household production-that
largely make up family life. One theorem provides that, "[i]f all
members of an efficient household have different comparative
advantages, no more than one member would allocate time to both the
market and the household sectors."21 Another of his theorems states that
"[i]f commodity production functions have constant or increasing returns
to scale, all members ofefficient households would specialize completely
in the market or household sectors and would invest only in market or
household capital."22

17

See STACEY, supra note 14, at 10, for a definition and discussion of "modem" and
"iostmodern" families.
I
GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981).
19 See, e.g., Steven L. Nock, Why Not Marriage?, 9 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 273, 276
& n.8 (2001) (citing to Becker's description of"marital-specific capital"). Other family
theorists, who do not necessarily subscribe to Becker's views, regularly cite his treatise
as articulating a type of analysis since used to prescribe a 'traditional' family code. See,
e.g., JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY
LAw 3-9, 16-19, 30-34 (2000) (portraying Becker's economic theory of the family as
rzrresentative of defenses of the specialized two-parent family).
2
BECKER, supra note 18, at 14-37.
21
!d. at 17.
22 /d. at 19 (emphasis added).
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Becker argues that a division of labor would still be efficient even
between "intrinsically identical" spouses. 23 However, he suggests that
women have a "comparative advantage" when it comes to both
childbearing and childrearing. Because even small differences along
gender lines result in a rational gendered division of labor, women
should "specialize" in household activities while men "specialize" in the
market. 24 Becker concludes that this division of labor most benefits
families, suggesting that wives either devote their time entirely to
caretaking and homemaking, or at least limit their workforce
participation so that they are able to take on the lion's share of
caretaking and household responsibilities.2 5
Modem family theory thus views the division of labor by gender as
the central advantage of the family, and codependence between husband
and wife (their "complementarity," as opposed to equality) as a
necessary corollary:26

23

GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON TIIE FAMILY 30-37 (1981).
[EJven if a husband and wife are intrinsically identical, they gain from a
division of labor between market and household activities ... The gain
comes from increasing returns to investments in sector-specific human
capital that raise productivity mainly in either the market or the nonmarket
sectors. Therefore, even small differences between men and womenpresumably related at lease partially to the advantages of women in the
birth and rearing of children-would cause a division of labor by gender,
with wives more specialized to household activities and husbands more
specialized to other work."
!d. at 3-4. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 155-58
~1992).

4
25

BECKER, supra note 23, at 4.
BECKER, supra note 18, at 21-23. The idealization of mothers as the "natural"
primary caretaker continues. Psychologist Brenda Hunter is among many professionals
who urge women to abandon paid market work in order to stay home with their children
and fulfill their womanhood. See generally BRENDA HUNTER, THE POWER OF MOTHER
LOVE (1998).
26 Other theorists who endorse role specialization as the central feature of marriage
nonetheless acknowledge that such specialization can lead to opportunistic behavior.
Investments made by each partner are not symmetrical. Investment in market capital is
portable; investment in caretaking and the household is not-it is "marriage specific".
See Lloyd Cohen, Divorce and Quasi Rents: Or, I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life,
in 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987). Cohen argues that men benefit from marriage the most
during the childrearing years that tend to come early in the relationship. During that
period in their lives, wives' perfonning the bulk of the childrearing and household tasks
enables their husbands to concentrate their efforts on developing their careers. Women
enjoy the greatest benefits once their children are older and their husbands' earning
capacity has reached its peak. !d. at 287.
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Specialization of tasks, such as the division of labor between men
and women, implies a dependence on others for certain tasks.
Women have traditionally relied on men for provision of food,
shelter, and protection, and men have traditionally relied on women
for the bearing and rearing of children and the maintenance of the
home. Consequently, both men and women have been made better
offby a 'marriage ' . .. 27
Other proponents of the modem family envision a modified version
of the modem nuclear family-still characterized by a market/household
division of labor, but somewhat less circumscribed by the biologism of
Becker's analysis. David Popenoe, for example, envisions a family in
many ways indistinguishable from Becker' s "efficient" family, at least
during the childrearing years. 28 In Popenoe's ideal world, mothers
would care for children full-time in their infancy. Once children have
reached twelve to eighteen months of age, mothers could resume
working part-time, but preferably not return to full-time work until their
children have reached their teen years. Popenoe does suggest that
fathers could stay home part-time to care for non-infant children while
mothers resume full-time work; but during infancy, he claims that
children cared for by their mothers "appear to have distinct advantages
over those reared apart from their mothers."29 This modified vision of
the modem marital family acknowledges both the importance "for
women [of being] able to achieve the economic, social, and psychic

When a marriage breaks down, the spouse who has specialized in the domestic aspects of
the marriage will suffer a disproportionate loss. Ira Ellman agrees that specialization is a
rational choice for married couples with different earning capacities. He argues that
legal rules should encourage participation in such rational sharing by ensuring that a
spouse who sacrifices her own earning capacity in the marketplace to increase the
income and efficiency of the marital unit as a whole is not penalized when the marriage
ends. Ira Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. I, 46-51 (1989).
Accordingly, Ellman proposes that states adopt systems of alimony based on
compensating divorcing spouses for marriage-related economic losses as an attempt to
"reallocate the post-divorce financial consequences of marriage in order to prevent
distorting incentives" from affecting individuals' choices during a marriage. !d. at 50.
27 BECKER, supra note 18, at27 (emphasis added).
28 David Popenoe, Modern Marriage: Revising the Cultural Script, in PROMISES TO
KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL Of MARRIAGE IN AMERJCA 247, 262-65 (David Popenoe,
eta/., eds., 1996).
29 !d. at 264.
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rewards of the workplace" 30 and the reality that economic necessity may
require that both husband and wife work. 31

B. Feminist Critiques and Postmodern Marriage
Feminists have voiced multiple objections to this modem vision of
family, critiquing both the marital relationship itself and inequities
caused by the privileging of the marital family in society. Feminists
have criticized marriage as it has actually been experienced by many
couples and have illustrated the many ways in which the institution
fails. 32 Indeed, the liberal feminist view, characterized by the work of
Susan Moller Okin, criticizes the very specialization that Becker praises.
Okin draws on studies of power within families that demonstrate that
"the amount of money a person earns-in comparison with a partner's
income--establishes relative power."33 Women's historic economic
vulnerability reinforces and perpetuates the historically hierarchical
social arrangement within marriage. In this arrangement, husbands are
heads of household, and wives owe them domestic and sexual services
and obedience. 34 The marital family has thus contributed to social and
economic marginalization of women and perpetuated male dominance
and patriarchy.35 Okin instead envisions the egalitarian family as the
solution to the problem of women's subordination and economic
vulnerability. Such a family would "encourage and facilitate the equal
sharing by men and women of paid and unpaid work, of productive and
reproductive labor."36
Yet unlike Okin and the liberal feminists, other feminist thinkers
believe that the gendered nature of the nuclear marital family will be
resistant to all but the most radical transformations. Like the liberal
30 /d. at 262. See also Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, I 00 COLUM. L. REv. 1881 (2000).
31 Popenoe, supra note 28 at 264.
32 See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 145-66 ( 1995); Nancy D. Po1ikoff,

We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not
''Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, " 79 VA. L. REv. 1535,
1535-41 (1993); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT l-9 (2000).
33 SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 157-59 (1989). See also
Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, I 04 CoLUM. L. REv. 75
(2004); M. Rivka Po1atnick, Why Men Don't Rear Children: A Power Analysis, in
MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 21, 24-28 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983).
34
See NANCY F. COTI, PuBLIC Vows 12 (2000).
35 OKIN, supra note 33, at 171.

36

/d.
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feminists, they reject the classic conception of the modem marital family
form. But this group, led by Martha Fineman, also criticizes the ideal of
the egalitarian family as fundamentally insufficient to overcome the
Fineman
gendered and unequal nature of the marital family. 37
acknowledges that attaining equality in the marketplace, one of the goals
of the egalitarian couple, potentially leaves the family without available
caretakers. 38 "Shared" caretaking between parents has remained
illusory-whether or not both partners work, women perform the
majority of domestic work. 39 Furthermore, when couples must
inevitably compromise one partner's career to provide caretaking, both
economic considerations and social conditioning drive the choice.
Unless they are able to hire others to perform caretaking functions, it is
women who typically give up their aspirations of market equality and
either abandon the marketplace or limit their market activities to enable
them to become primary caretakers. These dilemmas underscore the
gendered core of the modem family. 40
Fineman argues that so long as society allocates the responsibility
for caretaking solely to the nuclear family, women's inequality will
continue. She further asserts that society has an interest in providing for
its dependents and that mothering41 should be recognized as a socially
beneficial caretaking function. She recommends giving primacy and
privacy to the mother-child relationship, as opposed to the husband-wife
relationship. This would include de-privileging the marital family,
discontinuing the subsidies it receives, and abolishing legal recognition
of marriage altogether. In its place, the mother-child dyad should be
considered the central family relationship, entitled to state support and
subsidy.42

37
38
39

FINEMAN, supra note 32, at 27, 70-89, 157-66.
Id. at 164-66.
/d.

/d.
Fineman views "mothering" as a gendered activity different in quality from
"fathering". She argues that:
[t]he Mother/Child metaphor represents a specific practice of social and
emotional responsibility ... [M]en can and should be Mothers. In fact, if
men are interested in acquiring legal rights of access to children (or other
dependents), I argue they must be Mothers in the stereotypical nurturing
sense of that term-that is, engaged in caretaking.
FINEMAN, supra note 32, at 234-35 (emphasis in the original).
42 FINEMAN, supra note 32, at 230-36.

40
41
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Fineman criticizes feminist family theorists for limiting their focus
to explorations of inequities and injustices within the family. 43 She
considers it a mistake to concentrate exclusively on the unequal
relationships inside the family unit and instead urges feminists to "look
to what work the idea of a marital family does in society, and the ways
in which public and private institutions rely on that work getting
done." 44 The work of feminist theorists, then, should include examining
the institution of the family itself within a larger societal context. 45
The analysis of marriage and the marital family below attempts such
an examination. Part III separates out the component functions of
marriage, starting with an idealized vision of marriage derived from
conceptions of the modern marital family discussed above. Parsing the
marital family and analyzing its primary functions helps clarify how
each of those functions relates to society and how (and whether) each
furthers societal goals.
C.

A Functional Approach

A functional approach to marital and family theory has been
employed by family law scholars and practitioners in the recent past.
That approach seeks first to identify the essential characteristics of or
functions performed by the conventionally accepted relationship, i.e., the
43 Martha A. Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 239, 252-53 (2001).
For example, Katharine Bartlett has suggested that feminism' s principal contribution to
family law "has been to open up that institution to critical scrutiny and question the
justice of a legal regime that has permitted, even reinforced, the subordination of some
family members to others." Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM.
L.Q. 475, 475 (1999). Fineman suggests that Bartlett's observations reflect feminist
family law's too-limited focus. Feminists have indeed made gains by challenging
traditional patriarchal family law and have helped in the attainment of formal gender
equality. But feminism's efforts stopped short of challenging the very meaning of
marriage and the marital family in the societal context. Fineman, supra at 252-53.
44 Id. at 253.
45 Roscoe Pound, for example, sought to have individual and societal interests, such as
the family and marriage as social institutions, "compared on the same plane". See
generally Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. I , 2, 20-22
(I 943). Pound believed the family and marriage to be so central to society's well-being
that its preservation alone was an important societal interest. According to Pound, the
societal interest comprised, "on the one hand a social interest in the maintenance of the
family as a social institution and on the other hand a social interest in the protection of
dependent persons, in securing to all individuals a moral and social life and in the rearing
and training of sound and wetl-bred citizens for the future." Roscoe Pound, Individual
Interests in Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REv. 177, 182 ( 1916). A feminist critique,
on the other hand, refuses to take as given the inherent superiority of the marital family
form, or the inevitability of this societal role for the marital family.
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nuclear marital family.
It then inquires whether an alternative
relationship or set of relationships shares those characteristics. If so,
then the alternative relationship ought also to receive the benefits
accorded the conventionally recognized relationship. The primary goal
of this approach has been to gain inclusion of non-conventional family
forms in the defmition of "family" so that they may receive benefits
enjoyed by modem marital families. 46 Yet although the functional
approach continues to be argued by litigants and implemented in family
cases including, for example, custody, visitation,47 and adoption,48 it has
46 See, e.g., Paula Ettelbrick, Who Is a Parent?: The Need to Develop a Lesbian
Conscious Family Law, 10 N .Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513, 514-15 (1993); Nancy
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs
of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459,
471-73 (1990); Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of
"Family", 26 GONZ. L. REv. 91,92 (1990/1991); supra note 12 at 1641.
See also Braschi v. Stahl Associates, 74 N.Y.2d 201 (1989). The New York Court of
Appeals' decision in Braschi is an important manifestation of the functional view of the
family in the courts. The question in the case was whether the same-sex partner of a
deceased man could inherit a rent-controlled apartment after the death of his partner,
whose name was on the lease. In order for him to do so, the couple had to be considered
a "family" under New York's rent-control laws (under the governing law, a landlord
could not evict either the surviving spouse or some other member of the deceased
tenant's family who has been living with the tenant "in the housing accommodation as a
primary residence who can prove emotional and financial commitment, and
interdependence between such person and the tenant." Rent and Eviction RegulationsNew York City, 9 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS § 2204.6 (d) (3) (2003)). The Court
found that the relationship between the two men properly constituted a family because
they had lived together for more than ten years, shared social lives, domestic
responsibilities, and financial obligations. It held that "the term family as used in 9
NYCRR 2204.6 (d), should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized
their relationship", but should instead reflect "the reality of family life." Braschi, 74
N.Y.2d at 211. The Court reasoned that a functional approach was justified since the
policy rationales underlying the regulations were equally served by protecting committed
cohabitants as they were by protecting marital families. The Court announced that "a
more realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime
partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial
commitment and interdependence." !d.
47 For example, sixteen states have reported cases granting custody or visitation to the
same-sex (non-adoptive) partners or former partners of children's parents, thus
acknowledging the existence of a bond analogous to that of a parent and child. See, e.g.,
Guardianship of Olivia J., 84 Cal. App. 4 111 1146, 1159 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); In re The
Matter of Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); S.F. v. M.D .. ,
751 A.2d 9, 10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); E.N.O v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 889
(Mass. 1999); McGuffin v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995);
LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. lOll (2000); In re Matter of T.L.A.L., 1996 Mo. Cir. WL 393521 at *4; V.C. v.
M.J.B., 725 A.2d 13, 22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), ajf'd, 748 A.2d 539 (N.J.
2000)s, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 926 (2000); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2D 660, 666 (N.M. Ct.
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since lost favor with legal scholars. These theorists have identified
significant problems with relying on this theory to extend recognition to
alternative families.
Arguably the most significant drawback to using a functional theory
to gain legal recognition of nontraditional families is that doing so
implicitly concedes the marital nuclear family as the paradigmatic
family form. 49 The unmodified "family" is understood as describing a
grouping that originates with and centers around a marital union. 50
Nonmarital intimate relationships continue to be measured against that
norm, and those relationships receive recognition only to the extent that
they resemble and reference the marital nuclear family.

App. 1992); J.C. v. C.T., 711 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000); Liston v. Pyles,
1997 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS 3627 at *16; T.B. v. L.R.M., 753 A.2d 873, 876-77 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2000); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 961 (R.I. 2000); Jones v. Fowler,
969 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1998); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 690 (Vt. 1997);
Holtzmann v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419,421 (Wis. 1995).
48 Adoptions by same-sex couples have been approved (in reported cases) in eight
states (Connecticut, Delaware, Jllinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Vermont) and the District of Columbia. See In reAdoption of Baby Z.,
699 A.2d 1065, I 068 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996) (permitting same-sex couple to apply to
state adoption review board for waiver of adoption provision of "statutory parent"
adoption, with adoption to be allowed upon granting of waiver); In re Hart, 806 A.2d
1179, 1185 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 843 (D.C. 1995); In re
K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315,
319 (Mass. 1993); Adoption ofTwo Children By H.N.R, 666 A.2d 535,536 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995); Matter of Jacob,660 N.E.2d 397,405 (N.Y. 1995); In reAdoption
of E.O.G., 28 Pa. D. & C.4m 262, 265 (1993); In re Adoption of B.L.V.B.• 628 A.2d
1271, 1273-4 (Vt. 1993). See also Elaine Herscher, At Long Last, They Are Family:
State Permits Adoptions by Unmarried Couples, S.F. CHRON., Jan. II, 2000, at Al5
(reporting reversal of California Department of Social Services policy rejecting
unmarried partners as adoptive parents).
49 See, e.g., Ann Shalleck, Foundational Myths and the Reality of Dependency: The
Role ofMarriage, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL 'y & L. 197, 201-02 ( 1999) ("[E)fforts
to analogize other relationships to marriage, in order to achieve for those units the
privileges of marriage, serve primarily to reinforce, rather than challenge, the primacy of
the marriage relationship.") (citations omitted); Note, Looking for a Family
Resemblance, supra note 12, at 1641 ("The functional approach acknowledges the
paradigm of the nuclear family but also legitimizes non-nuclear relationships that share
the essential characteristics of traditional relationships.").
50
Language is an important indicator of (and contributor to) societal norms. The
unmodified "family" is commonly used to describe the nuclear marital family. Family
forms that differ from this model are frequently modified so as to identify the manner in
which they differ from the norm-thus, they are "single-parent families" and "same-sex
couples". See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 46, at 1-9 (1995).
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Nonmarital families seeking to be recognized as families, moreover,
have in some cases been held to a higher standard than marital nuclear
families. For example, marital relationships that deviate in some way
from the norm (e.g., the husband and wife who live in different cities
and see each other only on weekends; or the couple that keeps financial
affairs separate) nonetheless receive the benefits ofmarriage.51
The law presumes the validity of the marital relationship.
Nonmarital intimate relationships, on the other hand, have been denied
legal recognition when the relationships do not comprise one or more of
the features traditionally associated with the conventional marital
family. 52
The normalizing of the nuclear marital family form is thus a
significant-and perhaps fatal-drawback of the functional approach.
And the approach suffers from another, closely related weakness:
requisite identification of whose "conventional" modem family achieves
norm status. The functional approach requires, moreover, that the
norm-the prototypical family-be defmed.
Once that norm is
articulated, it becomes the reference point against which other
relationships can be compared. The norm (here, the marital nuclear
family) becomes defined even more narrowly. The result is that even
those families who fall within the broad category of "marital family" can
be nonetheless effectively defined out of that category. Their family
form becomes one that law does not necessarily want to perpetuate.
Explicit norm definition risks essentializing that which we think we
know and can define (here, the "marital family"), without
acknowledging or recognizing that our conceptions are colored by our
own biases and experiences. The approach risks failing to recognize the
diversity within the modem family, and by not acknowledging the
51

See, e.g.,Treuthart, supra note 39, at 98. Treuthart observes that:
Neither pennanence, procreation, economic interdependence nor even
sexual exclusivity is currently required for a valid marriage. Indeed,
marriage partners could reside separate and apart from one another
without sharing any aspects of their lives and still reap all the legal
benefits of marriage unless their coupling could be deemed a sharn.

!d.
52 See, e.g. , In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 475 U .S. 1085 (1986). The judge who inquired into the nature of the relationship
between Sharon Kowalski and her partner placed as much importance on evidence that
Kowalski had recently closed the couple's joint bank account as on other evidence ofthe
couple's commitment within the relationship. See id. at 863.
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legitimacy (or existence) of other experiences, it renders them inferior or
invisible.
The functional approach, finally, can lead to unpredictability. It is
not always clear which feature or features will be sufficient for a
nonmarital relationship to be considered a family. Further, judges may
express their personal views about what sorts of relationships should
count as a family by emphasizing certain functions over others-under
the guise of exercising their discretion. 53
Despite this litany of problems with functional analysis of marriage,
Part III draws from this approach. But I aim to avoid the pitfalls of the
standard approach. Unlike earlier functional analyses, my approach
does not dismantle the marital family in order to identify those
"essential" components that nontraditional families ought to mimic in
order to receive the same benefits. Instead, this revised functional
approach offers a method to those who promote marriage as social
policy and privilege it in law for doing what I believe is essential:
subjecting the institution itself-and the roles it plays in society-to
more rigorous analysis.

III. FUNCTIONALISM REDUX: DISMANTLING MODERN
MARRIAGE
Policymakers currently treat marriage as a private and all-butinscrutable relationship, 54 yet a revised functional approach challenges
53

See Martha L. Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out? 62 U. COLO.

L. REv. 269,276-77 (1991).
54

That is, at least until its dissolution, at which time the state may intervene and
decide economic distribution, ongoing financial obligations between the parties, and
rights of child custody and visitation.
There are a number of exceptions to state respect for marital privacy. One relatively
recent exception is the refusal of law to tolerate violence within families. See, e.g.,
Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 222 (Ga. 1985) (rejecting the spousal rape exception,
which made it legally impossible for a husband to be guilty of raping his wife); State ex
rei. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223,227 (Mo. 1982) (upholding the constitutionality
of a state statute that permits any adult abused by a household member or former
household member to obtain an ex parte order of protection).
Another exception is the common law requirement that some minimum level of support
be provided within marriage. See, e.g., Sharpe Furniture, Inc. v. Buchstaff, 299 N.W.2d
219, 220 (Wis. 1980). The Court in Sharpe held a husband liable under the doctrine of
necessaries for the cost of a sofa purchased on credit by his wife. The doctrine of
necessaries provides that, "when an item or service is obtained for the benefit of the
family which is necessary and no payment for that item or service has been made .. . the
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the perception of marriage as a benevolent monolith. It instead allows
for more precise identification of the ways in which marriage may
further social goals and lays bare those aspects of marriage that may not
contribute to any identifiable social good.
I take as a starting point a vision of the idealized marriage, derived
from conceptions of the modern marital family discussed in Part II
above. 55 I consciously use as a framework a normative vision of
marriage-not necessarily marriage as it is actually experienced, but
rather an idealized conception of marriage embraced by its proponents. I
adopt this approach for two reasons: First, using a paradigm that
presumes a marriage that functions in society the way it is "supposed to"
can illustrate more powerfully that serious problems exist with the use of
marriage as state policy. Second, there is no "every-marriage". As
Barbara Stark has pointed out, "[t]here are innumerable marriages, ...
and most of them go through different phases. " 56 It is not the purpose of
this Article to describe the many manifestations of the marital
relationship or illustrate the myriad ways in which marriages fail. The
Article maintains instead that, given the functions performed by even the
most successful marriages, state privileging and promoting of the
institution as a whole is both indefensible as ideology and inefficient as
policy.
I next dissect this idealized vision of marriage into its component
functions, analyzing each individually. These separate analyses depart
somewhat from the normative in order to descriptively address each
component, and to consider the theoretical basis for state involvement in
husband is primarily liable." /d. The Court found the sofa to be a necessary item
benefiting the family. But cf Cheshire Medical Center v. Holbrook, 663 A.2d 1344,
1347 (N.H. 1995) (finding the gender bias of doctrine of necessaries unconstitutional,
and instead imposing a reciprocal obligation of support on both partners to a marriage).
See also McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336,342 (Neb. 1953) (denying wife's petition
for maintenance and support when husband and wife lived together and husband
provided minimally for her maintenance-"[t]he living standard of a family are a matter
of concern to the household, and not for the courts to determine.").
As these cases illustrate, a spouse must take piecemeal steps to assure her level of
support (for example, buying on credit, getting sued, and then obtaining her partner's
contribution), but she is not permitted to bring a support action to secure that right
through a single overall remedy.
In virtually all other respects, however, the state recognizes the privacy of the intact
marital relationship. See f{NEMAN, supra note 32, at 177-93.
55 See discussion infra Part II.A.
56 Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern
Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1479, 1483 (2001).
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each. After examining each of the primary functional components of
marriage, I conclude that active state involvement is independently
justified in only two of the primary functional components of the marital
family, dependent caretaking and the provision of economic support.
The implications of this argument are discussed in Part IV.
Some may object to the notion that marriage can be broken down
and analyzed according to its various functions, arguing that the whole is
more than the sum of its parts and that marriage is in some respects
inscrutable.
For instance, Bruce Hafen contemplates that an
unidentifiable "something about the combined permanence, authority,
and love that characterize the formal family uniquely makes possible"
the work of teaching children moral and civic duty. 57 It is difficult to
address such arguments. One surmises that their often-unspoken origin
rests simply in the relative prevalence and success of the marital family
in society. Because this is the conventional family form and the one that
has been exclusively supported and subsidized throughout this country's
history, it is unsurprising that it is also the family form that feels natural
and right to the majority of us. I argue that if we are going to embrace a
social policy that favors marital families over others, we must be able to
articulate a reasoned justification for it. A romantic ideal of the marital
relationship and family is insufficient ground upon which to rest public
policy.

A. "We Are Gathered Here": The Expressive Function ofMarriage 58
Cass Sunstein has described the "expressive dimension" of conduct
as being, "very simply, the attitudes and commitments that the conduct
signals."59 Conduct that may not have a consciously or explicitly
expressive purpose (and thus might not be considered "expressive
conduct" or "symbolic speech"60 under First Amendment analysis)
57

Bruce Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy;
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 477 (1983)
~emphasis added).
8 Diane Weinroth of American University and Judith Sandalow of the Children's Law
Center shared with me their views on the expressive aspect of marriage. Those
conversations led to the development of this section.
59 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 903, 925
(1996). I am not referring here to the expressive dimension oflaw. See also Elizabeth S.
Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 195556 (2000).
60 See, e.g.. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984)
(observing that 'a message may be delivered by conduct that is intended to be
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nonetheless frequently has an expressive effect. An actor's conduct may
thus communicate to observers certain attitudes or beliefs, regardless of
whether the actor intends, or is even aware of, the message or messages
conveyed.61 Those who marry, by committing that very act, convey a
very particular set of messages-for example, love for and commitment
to another, but also implicit approval of the privileging of heterosexual
norms-the communication of which the state should neither promote
nor discourage. 62
The expressive component of marriage has much power, and thus
importance, for a number of reasons. First, the sheer number of people
who marry magnifies the act's communicative effect. Some 90 percent
of all Americans will marry during their lifetimes, and more than 70
percent of people who divorce remarry. 63 Second, because the state
requires that the commitment be made publicly, the communicative
effect is necessarily more significant than it is for non-public forms of
conduct. In fact, for many people, their engagement and wedding
announcements, wedding invitations, and the actual declaration of
marriage vows in the wedding ceremony are among the most public
statements they ever make. Both legal requirements and extralegal
norms, which are inextricably linked,64 have historically operated
together to make this so.
Since colonial times, the state has encouraged couples to formalize
their relationships by marrying in accordance with nuptiallaws.65 All of
the colonial provinces enacted marriage codes based on British law.
These codes set forth procedures with which couples were required to
communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be
communicative.") (emphasis added).
6! Sunstein, supra note 59, at 925.
62 See infra notes 55-86 and accompanying text.
63
See, STEPHANIE COONTZ, THEWAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN fAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 15 (1993). In 2001, for example, 2, 327,000 couples married. See also
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, State and Territorial Data, in FAST STATS:
A TO Z, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fasats/marriage.htm (last visited March
15, 2004).
64
"Extralegal" norms include social, cultural, and religious norms. See Stark, supra
note 56, at 1492. See generally Sunstein, supra note 59, at 907 ("[B]ehavior is
pervasively a function of norms ... [and] norm management is an important strategy for
accomplishing the objectives of law . . .."). Legal rules can shape, and be shaped by,
extralegal norms. Legislators obviously cannot directly change extralegal societal
norms. But to the extent those norms reflect existing legal rules, they can rewrite those
rules.
65 Supra note 5, at 64-69.
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comply in order to legally marry. Many of these procedures highlighted
the public aspect of marriage, and the community's interest and
involvement in marital relationships. For example, couples were
required to publicize their intention to marry. The posting of marriage
announcements, or "banns," as they were known, informed the
community of the couple's intentions to marry and so ensured that
anyone who objected to the union might come forward and intervene. 66
While no longer legally required, public announcement of
engagements and weddings, frequently in local newspapers, remains a
common practice today. State regulations continue in other ways to
require that entry into marriage-in many ways an intimate and private
relationship--be a public act. Couples must obtain state-issued (and
publicly-recorded) licenses and conduct ceremonies in compliance with
state regulations in order for their marriages to be valid.67 Furthermore,
while most state regulations merely require the presence of a witness or
witnesses to the marriage ceremony, it is customary for the couple's
community of kinfolk and friends (as many as can attend or be
accommodated) to attend and celebrate a couple's nuptials.
In the face of this relentless institutionalization of matrimony,
common law marriage, which requires no state act or involvement for its
validation, is a rapidly disappearing example of a privatized domestic
relationship.68 For a marriage to be valid at common law, parties must
simply have the legal capacity to marry, agree to marry, cohabit, and
consistently hold themselves out as married. 69 No state-sanctioned
official need to officiate, nor must there be a wedding or marriage
66

!d. at 67-69. Engaged couples were required to post notice of their pending nuptials
in a conspicuous place for a specified period of time prior to their wedding. !d. at 67. In
an alternate procedure, known as licensing, a magistrate conveyed upon the couple the
111
community's blessing of their union. !d. Banns were replaced, beginning in the mid-19
century, by advance notice requirements. !d. at 93. These requirements imposed waiting
geriods before a couple would be permitted to marry. !d.
7 See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., & ANN LAQUER ESTIN, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 99-100 (6111 ed., 2000).
68 See Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 225,
256 ( 1997) [hereinafter Cahn, Moral Complexities]; Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist
Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709,712 (1996).
69 See, Cahn, Moral Complexities, supra note 68. See also, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 2.401 (Vernon 2004) (declaring common law marriage valid if proven by
evidence indicating parties to relationship agreed to be married, cohabited as man and
wife, and represented themselves to others as married). A minority of states continue to
recognize common law marriage. See infra note 72.
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license. 70 In the early twentieth century, two-thirds of the states
recognized common law marriage. 71 It has since been abolished in all
but eleven states and the District of Columbia.72 Its decline assures that
entry into marriage will continue to be a public, as opposed to private,
act.73
What messages are communicated by those who marry? Typically,
the most intentional and visible message is the public expression of love
for and lifelong commitment to another. Indeed, in Turner v. Safley, the
Supreme Court explicitly recognized this aspect of marriage in the
process of protecting prisoners' right to marry while incarcerated. The
Court reasoned that even if one spouse were physically absent from the
marriage, there were other important elements of the marital relationship

70

See Cahn, Moral Complexities, supra note 59, at 256.
See, Bowman , supra note 59, at n.24. See also GRAHAM DoUTHWAITE,
UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW, 274-607 (1979), for a state-by-state analysis of the
status of common law marriage. Ten states had abolished common law marriage by
1920, including Alaska (1917), Arizona (1913), Arkansas (1875), California (1985),
Hawaii (1920), Illinois (1905), Kentucky (1952), Massachusetts (1892), North Dakota
(1890), and Wisconsin (1917). Id., at 279, 283, 287, 291, 343, 353, 377,410,496, 598.
After 1921 (and as recently as 1997), an additional 19 states abolished common law
marriage. These states included Florida (1968), Georgia (1997), Indiana ( 1958),
Michigan (1957), Minnesota (1941), Mississippi (1956), Missouri (1921), Nebraska
(1923), Nevada (1943), New Jersey (1939), New York (1933), North Carolina (1975),
Ohio (1991), Oklahoma (1994), Oregon (1976), South Dakota (1959), Tennessee (1955),
Vermont (1978), and Washington (1937). !d. at 325, 334, 362, 418, 425,431, 436, 448,
453,462,479,490,501,509,518,548,554,578,588.
72 Those jurisdictions that continue to recognize common law marriages are Alabama,
Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Utah, Texas, and the District of Columbia. See IDAHO CODE § 32-301 (1995)
(recognizing only those common law marriages entered into prior to January I, 1996);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.11 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN .. § 23-101 (2002); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 26-1-602, 40-1-403 (2003); 43 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1 (2001); 23 PA. CoNS.
STAT. ANN.§ 1003 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 20-l-360 (2003); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.401 (1998); Piel v. Brown, 361 So.2d 90, 93 (Ala. 1978); Deter v. Deter, 484 P.2d
805, 806 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Johnson v. Young, 372 A.2d 992, 994 (D.C. 1977);
Souza v. O'Hara, 395 A.2d 1060,1061-62 (R.I. 1978).
73 Cahn notes this:
... [T]he virtual abolition of common law marriage has made entry into
marriage less private, thus reinforcing the public nature of marriage . . . A
common law marriage does not require any official state involvement for
its validation: no 'wedding,' no marriage license, and no state-sanctioned
person to declare the parties 'husband and wife.' As such, common law
marriage is a wonderful example of privatized domestic relations, yet it is
disappearing.
Cahn, Moral Complexities at 256.
71
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that remained deserving of constitutional protection. 74 The first element
discussed by the Court was the expressive component of marriage.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, described mamages as
compnsmg "expressions of emotional support and public
cornmi tment. " 75
Many Americans consider marriage a religious ceremony and
institution, even though the religious (or cultural) and civil elements of
marriages are conceptually and effectively distinct.76
The state
recognizes and gives legal effect only to marriages entered into in
accordance with civil regulations. 77 While many marriage ceremonies
combine both religious or cultural aspects and compliance with civil
requirements, a religious component is unnecessary for a valid civil
marriage. Yet despite the formal separation of church and state,
Christian tenets are reflected through legislation and in case law
governing marriage.78 Anglo-American marriage laws were derived
from the Christian tradition of indissolubility and followed canon law. 79
74
75
76

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,95 {1987).
!d. at 95-96.
This widespread sentiment has found its way into law. The D.C. Code provides an
example:
For the purpose of preserving the evidence of marriages in the District of
Columbia, every minister of any religious society approved or ordained
according to the ceremonies of his religious society, whether his residence
is in the District of Columbia or elsewhere ... may be authorized by any
judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to celebrate
marriages in the District of Columbia.
2001 D.C. STAT. § 46-406. The statute goes on to permit only one other
group-"any judge or justice of any court of record"-to celebrate
marriages in the District of Columbia. /d.. President George W. Bush, at
a recent press conference expressed his belief that "[m]arriage cannot be
severed from its cultural, religious, and natural roots without weakening
[its] good influence [on] society."
Bush, supra note 4.
77 See CLARK &ESTIN, supra note 67, at 99-l 00.
78 NANCY F. Con, PUBLIC VOWS 6 {2000); GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 66. See also
Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church, and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and
Religious Authority,26 J. FAMJLY LAW 741, 750-66 (1987-88). We would be naive to
believe that religion-influenced legislation or policy is a thing of the past. House
majority leader Tom DeLay, for instance, was quoted as insisting that "only Christianity
offers a way to live in response to the realities that we find in this world--<>nly
Christianity." DeLay went on to claim that he was "on a mission from God to promote a
'biblical worldview' in American politics." Paul Krugman, Editorial, Gotta Have Faith,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at A3S.
79
See generally Peter J. Riga, Residue of Romano-Canonical Marriage Law in
Modern American Law, 5 WHITTIER L. REv. 37 (1983) (tracing the historical and cultural
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The Turner Court noted that "the commitment of marriage may be an
exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal
dedication."80 The opposite-sex requirement-a constant, of course, of
marriage-related legislation at the federal and state levels-also has its
origins in the Christian biblical tradition. 81 Historically, and even today,
judicial decisions in the United States-especially those concerning
marriage and family law-are replete with expressions and applications
of Christian ideals and values.82 While the Christian imperative has
been less explicitly invoked in recent court decisions (for example, those
involving same-sex unions), it continues to inform legal outcomes. 83
genealogy of our modem legal system of marriage). In the country's earlier days, the
Supreme Court acknowledged the primacy of Christianity in the United States. See
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (referring to the
United States as a "Christian nation"); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625
( 1931) (referring to Church of the Holy Trinity for the proposition that the citizens of the
United States are a "Christian people").
80 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 96.
81 See Leviticus 18:22 (Revised Standard Version) ("You shall not lie with a male as
with a woman; it is an abomination."). See also Leviticus 20:13 (Revised Standard
Version) ("If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an
abomination; they shall be put to death, their blood is upon them.").
82 For example, in an early case deciding that only monogamous marriages would
remain legal, the Supreme Court stated that "polygamy is . . . contrary to the spirit of
Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the western
world." Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. I, 49
(1890). Christian morality and value systems have provided the underpinning for how
the state conceives of monogamous marriage. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 113 U.S. 333
( 1890). The Court justified the suppression of polygamy with reference to Christian
values and "the whole punitive power of the government for acts, recognized by the
general consent of the Christian world in modem times as proper matters for prohibitory
legislation." !d.. at 343. See also In re Siveke, 441 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1981) ("Of course, the proposition that the relationship of husband and wife is special
and unique finds support in scripture as well, wherein we are told, 'Therefore a man
leaves his father and mother and cleaves to his wife, and they become one flesh."')
(citing Genesis 2:24); Dan S. Browning, Biology, Ethics, and Narrative in Christian
Family Theory, 119, 119-56, in PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA (Popenoe, et al., eds. 1996); Scott C. Idleman, Note, The Role of
Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433, 474-477 (1993).
83 See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (lith Cir. 1997) (upholding a State Attorney
General's revocation of a job offer to the plaintiff because the plaintiff had married her
same-sex partner in a religious ceremony). In Shahar, the plaintiff argued that her
marriage was a protected exercise of her religion. The court disagreed, reasoning that,
"[g]iven especially that Plaintiffs religion requires a woman neither to 'marry' another
female-even in the case of lesbian couples-nor to marry at all, considerable doubt also
exists that she has a constitutionally protected federal right to be 'married' to another
woman to engage in her religion." !d. at 1099. See also, Mark Strasser, Same-Sex
Marriages and Civil Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise, and Constitutional
Guarantees, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 597 (2002). According to Strasser, the court's decision
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Given this tradition and the continued linking of marriage and religion,
marriage can symbolize acceptance by the marrying couple of both the
moral and religious conventions of society.
Those who marry also communicate that they possess the maturity
and responsibility necessary to fulfill the legal responsibilities of
marriage. 84 Public expression of these personal relationship traits can be
vital to an individual's conception and construction of personal identity.
The state protects and facilitates this personal expression. As illustrated
by the Court's opinion in Turner, the civil status of marriage lends
additional credibility and weight to the individual's statements of marital
commitment. 85 But arguably less benign (and sometimes unintended)
messages are necessarily conveyed as well when couples marry.
One such message is approval of societal privileging of
monogamous, heterosexual norms. Through the wedding ceremony, and
by its very entry into the marital institution, a couple expresses its
intention to conform to those norms.86 This is true even of married
in Shahar directly violates Supreme Court right-to-marry jurisprudence as articulated in
Turner. He argues that
[t]he Turner Court did not suggest that marriage would have religious
significance only if a duty to marry had been imposed by that religion, and
Turner makes clear that the state would be remiss for imposing
unnecessary burdens on marriage even without an explicit religious duty
to tie a marital knot.
!d. at 616.
As one might expect, with the right to marry becoming more fundamental in recent
years, courts addressing the constitutionality of many marriage restrictions have
generally avoided overt expressions of Christian tenets. See generally Strasser, supra.
Since marriage has been held to constitute a fundamental right, courts now attempt to
examine whether a restriction on marriage-such as the prohibition of polygamy-is
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest. See Potter v. Murray City, 585
F.Supp. 1126, 1140 (D. Utah 1984) ("There appear to the court to be no reasonable
alternatives to the prohibition of the practice of polygamy to meet the compelling state
interest found in the maintenance of the system of monogamy upon which its social
order is now based.").
84 Martha L. Fineman, Images ofMothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274,
290-91 (1991). In discussing her view of the ideology of patriarchy, Fineman has
described the "heterosexual expression traditionally realized through marriage" as
portraying within popular culture the "quintessential indication of maturity,
completeness, success, and power." !d.
85 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 95-96. See also David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Ca/1/t
Marriage": The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, ?4 S. CA.L.
L. REv. 925, 933-34 (2001).
86 One sociologist has described weddings as "one of the major events that signal[s]
readiness and prepare[s] heterosexuals for membership in marriage as an organized

332

Virginia Journal ofSocial Policy & the Law

[Vol. 11:3

individuals who in fact disapprove of the exclusion of same-sex couples
(or other excluded groupings) from civil marriage. Voluntary
membership in an organization or institution suggests approval of its
goals, as well as its rules-i.e., the means, in part, by which those goals
are furthered. A white person's membership in a country club that
excludes African Americans, for example, communicates something
about that person's feelings about racial privileging. At best, it
communicates that the white member doesn't feel strongly enough about
the exclusion of African Americans to refuse on principled grounds to
participate in the institution him or herself. At worst, it communicates
agreement with the exclusionary policy.
Too often, those of us with certain privileges are oblivious of the
benefits they confer upon us.87 Yet exercising privilege can perpetuate
the systematic oppression of those to whom the privilege is denied.
Unlike overt acts of cruelty, which may be readily identified as
oppression, the role of subtler systems of privilege in conferring
dominance upon certain groups while oppressing others is easily
overlooked. 88 As Jane Aiken has argued, "[t]he invisibility of privilege
allows us to reinforce dominance without any moral accountability for
our actions ... [but] one's exercise of privilege indirectly causes pain to

practice for the institution of heterosexuality." DAVID M . NEWMAN & ELIZABETH
GRAUERHOLZ, SOCIOLOGY OF FAMILIES 269 (2rd ed., 2002).
87 See Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making
Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 881, 882 (1995). Examples of
unconscious privilege include race (or white skin) privilege, class privilege, male gender
privilege, and heterosexual privilege. See also, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 224 (1989) (discussing male privilege); Barbara J.
Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 970 (1993) (discussing the invisibility of
whiteness and race privilege).
88 Frye argues that the combined privileges conferred on individuals or groups
possessing a favored characteristic construct invisible systems of oppression for those
denied such privileges. She offers the analogy of a bird in a cage to illustrate:
Consider a birdcage. If you look very closely at just one wire in the cage,
you cannot see the other wires . . . It is only when you step back, stop
looking at the wires one by one, microscopically, and take a macroscopic
view of the whole cage, that you see why the bird does not go
anywhere . . . It is perfectly obvious that the bird is surrounded by a
network of systematically related barriers, no one of which would be the
least hindrance to its flight, but which, by their relations to each other, are
as confining as the solid walls of a dungeon.
MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS ON FEMINIST THEORY 4-5 (1983).
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others."89 Civil marnage ts, and has always been, an exclusive
institution. It is exclusively heterosexual-all states currently prohibit
same-sex couples from entering into civil marriage. 90 The mixed-sex
requirement is so ingrained that many who argue for its retention
consider a tautological argument-that homosexuals should be
prohibited from marrying because marriage is by definition a
heterosexual relationship--convincing. 91
Couples who marry thus implicitly communicate approval (or, at
best, lack of principled disapproval) of the institutionalized heterosexual
privileging that is marriage-whether they intend to communicate this
approval or not. 92 Conversely, same-sex couples and others who cannot
89

Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness, and Morality", 4 CLINICAL
L. REv. 1, 18 (1997) (internal citation omitted).
90 Vermont has enacted a "civil union" statute that provides gay couples with the
tangible benefits of marriage. 15 VT. STAT. ANN .. § 1201 (2003). But the statute stops
short of permitting them to marry. /d. at § 120 I (4) (defining "marriage" as the "union of
one man and one woman."). Vermont does "[go] beyond existing 'domestic partnership'
and 'reciprocal beneficiaries' laws that exist in California and Hawaii and in many
localities in the U.S. today." National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex
Marriage, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES WEB SITE, last visited April
9, 2004, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm#DOMA.
In November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that prohibiting
same-sex marriage violates the state constitution. Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). The court stayed the decision for 180 days to
allow the legislature to "take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of this
opinion." /d. at 970.
9
See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C and 1 U.S.C.A. § 7
(1998). See also, President George W. Bush, News Conference in the White House Rose
Garden, supra note 66. Bush stated that "[the issue is} the defmition of marriage ... I
believe a marriage is between a man and a woman. And I think we ought to codify that
one way or the other."; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Backs Bid to Block Gays from Marrying,
N.Y. TiMES, Jul. 31, 2003, at AI. See also, Bush, supra note 4 (transcribed by FDCH EMedia). ·
92 Indeed, one might conceivably argue that, in order for a couple to enjoy the benefits
of marriage, they must subject themselves, in the words of Chief Justice Burger, to a:
state measure which forces an individual as part of his daily life ... to be
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of
view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the State "invades the sphere of
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment ... to
reserve from all official control.
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (internal citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme
Court in Wooley held unconstitutional a New Hampshire law that required most
automobiles to bear license plates with the state motto, "Live Free or Die". The Court
found that the law in effect required motorists to use their private property as "mobile
billboard[s]" for the State's ideological message. Chief Justice Burger emphasized that
the First Amendment protected "the right to refrain from speaking at all." /d. at 714-715.
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marry 93 are deprived of what David Cruz calls "the unique expressive
resource that is civil marriage. " 94 Those whose religious or cultural
belief systems embrace different forms of marriage (e.g., Mormon and
Muslim polygamy and Native American complex marriage 95 ) are not
only denied the expressive resource that is marriage, but instead their
family forms are also outlawed.96 While these individuals may possess
sentiments of love for and commitment to each other quite
indistinguishable from those of mixed-sex couples, those sentiments are
denied both the public expression and validation that is bestowed upon
married couples.97 Cruz argues that:
Marital commitment is expressed not simply by ceremonies,
rings, and gifts. It is also expressed by the act of
undertaking and continuing to live under the responsibilities
of civil marriage, and by letting it be known that one is
living as a part of a civil marriage. One's statements of
marital commitment gain additional credibility from the civil
status. A proposition of (civil) marriage is an invitation to a
partner to join a publicly valued institution, not simply to
maintain a relationship in the realm of the private.98
Their exclusion from the marital institution conveys to same-sex
couples and other excluded individuals that their families are not equally
valued participants in society. 99 Heterosexuals' continuing entry into
93 For example, couples who may want to enter committed, non-conjugal relationships
See discussion infra Part III.C (noting that
cannot enter valid marriages.
unconsummated marriages are considered void and may be annulled). Similarly, those
who wish to form committed (conjugal or non-conjugal) relationships comprising more
than two individuals may not marry. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting
the illegality of polygamous marriages).
94 Cruz, supra note 85, at 928-929.
95 See COTI, PUBLIC Vows, at 9-10,25-28.
96 See Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Potter v.
Murray City, 585 F.Supp. 1126, 1140 (D. Utah 1984); Con, PUBLIC Vows, at 24-28.
97 Marriage is so woven into the fabric of our culture that its meaning is universally
understood and receives public affirmation and approbation. Upon entry into marriage,
an individual's status in society is fundamentally transformed. The couple's community
bestows on the couple approval and esteem that is obtainable by no other discernible
means. NEWMAN & GRAUERHOLZ, supra note 86, at 268.
98 Cruz, supra note 85, at 933.
99 Several legal scholars argue that laws have communicative impact and have put
forward expressive theories of law. The communicative impact of laws can lead to the
altering of social norms. See Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 2021, 2029-44 (1996). See also, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1996) (developing an expressivist approach to
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marriage in the face of homosexuals' continued exclusion implicitly
validates this exclusion, whether heterosexuals actually approve of that
continued exclusion or not.
Marriage is thus a status that has come to have a definite, preordained meaning. That meaning is widely- and well-understood:
marriage has become a state-sponsored shorthand through which certain
individuals may publicly express their love for and commitment to each
other.
Those individuals also express their membership in, and
conformity with, mainstream morality and moral traditions Only
heterosexual, monogamous couples may participate in these traditionsmany other members of society are necessarily excluded both from
participating in the ceremonies and from benefiting from the legal
implications of marriage. By publicly exercising their marital privilege,
marrying couples reinforce the dominance of certain religious and moral
traditions over others. In order to receive the benefits of marriage,
couples must thus participate in the systematic oppression of those for
whom marriage is not an option.
I argue that the state's interest in expressions of intimate
commitment is limited to protecting individuals' freedom to express
their commitments in the manner they see fit and to protecting
individuals' rights to exercise their religious beliefs without undue
interference. But the state has little interest in the content and form of
individuals' expressions of intimate commitment. And it should
certainly not dictate the content and meaning of that expression. Yet,
through current marriage regulations that define who may and may not
marry, specify certain terms of the relationship, and require that couples'
entrance into the institution be a public act, the state does just that.

B.

"Till Death Do Us Part": The Companionate Function ofMarriage
[T]he value of commitment is fully realizable only in an
atmosphere of freedom to choose whether a particular
association will be fleeting or enduring .. . What begins to
matter more for the husband is not that his wife was once

laws prescribing criminal punishments); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 TermForward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. I, 8 (1976)
(embracing and elaborating on the expressive rationale for the antidiscrimination
principle adopted by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483
( 1954)). But see, Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview,
148 U. PA. L. REv. 1363 (2000) (rejecting expressive theories of Jaw and arguments that
the meaning of governmental action can have "foundational moral relevance.").
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ready to bind herself to him by ties enforceable by the state,
but that she remains committed to him day by day-not
because the law commands it but because she chooses the
commitment ... [O]nce the act of marriage recedes into the
past, the freedom to leave gives added meaning to the
decision to stay .100
When people marry, they affirm that they and their spouses will be
lifelong companions.
Companionship, mutual affection, and
commitment between two adults are generally considered primary
purposes of modem marriage. 101 Even the Roman Catholic Church,
which has long focused on procreation as the primary purpose of
marriage, now emphasizes the importance of commitment and
companionship. 102
In the past, the law treated the marriage commitment differently than
other commitments or contracts between individuals. 103 Laws governing
contracts for personal services, for example, required that breach be
remedied by the payment of damages. But laws governing marriage
100

Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 633,
637-38 (1980).
101 One of many examples of this: Goodridge, supra note 90 at 948.
102 See Vatican II, Gaudium et spes, 7 Dec. 1965, in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE
CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 950-57 (Austin Flannery, ed., 1975). The
Council of Vatican II, articulating official church doctrine, stated:
But marriage is not merely for the procreation of children: its nature as an
indissoluble compact between two people and the good of the children
demand that the mutual love of the partners be properly shown, that it
should grow and mature. Even in cases where despite the intense desire of
the spouses there are no children, marriage still retains its character of
being a whole manner and communion of life and preserves its value and
indissolubility.
/d. at 954. See also, JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND
REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW 135-36 (2000) (citing Fred J. Parrella, Same-Sex Marriage,
November 6, 1998 (unpublished manuscript on file with author)).
103 For a discussion of the ways in which marriages differ from other contracts, see,
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 159-160 (5"' ed. 1998). Posner
discusses several distinctions between marriages and other contracts, noting that married
couples: ( 1) are not free to set the terms of the contract; (2) are more severely sanctioned
for breach; (3) cannot generally seek court intervention to help them settle disputes; and
(4) are more likely to engage in conduct affecting third parties. /d. See also Darren
Bush, Moving to the Left by Moving to the Right: A Law & Economics Defense ofSameSex Marriage, 22 WOMEN's Rrs. L. REP. l\5, \24 (200\). Bush argues that, "from an
economic perspective, marriage appears no different than any other contract, having the
same potential for efficiency (and inefficiency) as a contract between two corporations."
/d.

2004]

Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy

337

enforced its indissolubility, requiring specific performance of marriage
contracts. 104 The state moved away from enforcing the indissolubility of
marriage with the adoption of judicial divorce in the nineteenth
century 105 and no-fault divorce in the twentieth. 106 Popular pressure led
to the development of these rules, and there is little chance that states
will revert even to fault-based divorce rules. to? I nonetheless examine
the nature of the state's interest in marital commitment, and whether that
interest justifies intervention to enforce or reinforce couples'
commitment to each other.tos
Marriage and the nuclear family moved to the center of social and
emotional life beginning in the nineteenth century. 109 Some point to
rising expectations of the companionate aspects of marriage as ironically
having contributed to increases in the divorce rate. 110 In his history of
law and the family in the nineteenth century, Michael Grossberg writes
that:
[T]he surging demand for divorce reflected the increasingly
intimate, emotional nature of marriage. No longer a mere partnership,
over the course of the nineteenth century it became a bond based
primarily on affection and thus one that would all the more easily
disintegrate as feelings changed. By officially dissolving a marriage
rather than informally separating, the parties freed themselves, in most
states, to enter another union formally .. . 111

GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 34-35.
!d. at 238.
See Henna Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce
and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CINN. L. REv. l, 44-51 (1987).
107 See Carbone, supra note 5, at 281. Carbone observes that there "seems to be little
sentiment for a return to fault-based divorce ... Public reaffirmation of the importance
of marriage is unlikely to affect those for whom marriage is not an attractive or realistic
o8:tion." [internal citations omitted].
1 8 I am speaking of lifelong marital commitment itself. The economic sharing and
support, for example, that many have come to associate with lifelong commitment (but
that can characterize many other relationships) is discussed infra.
I09 See STEPHANIE COONTZ, supra note 63, at 8-23 {1992).
110
GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 251.
111 !d. (internal citation omitted). William O'Neill, whom Grossberg cites in his
discussion of divorce and custody law, wrote that the need for divorce arises when
"families become the center of social organization." When that happens, " their intimacy
can become suffocating, their demands unbearable, and their expectations too high to be
easily realizable. Divorce then becomes the safety valve that makes the system
workable." WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 6-7 ( 1967).
I04
105
106

338

Virginia Journal ofSocial Policy & the Law

[Vol. 11:3

In the colonies, as in England, the virtual unavailability of divorce
reflected state acceptance of the church's view of marriage as a sacred,
lifelong commitment. The colonial states initially followed the English
practice of permitting divorce only by legislative act.1 12 Such divorces
were expensive, difficult to obtain and, unsurprisingly, rare. 113 In his
History of American Law , Lawrence Friedman noted that such a legal
system essentially resulted in two laws of divorce--one for the rich, and
one for the poor. 114 Many unhappy, poor married couples simply began
living apart; some entered into separation agreements, while others
simply remarried. Indeed, bigamy, in the form of serial monogamy
without divorce or death, was conunon. 115 But despite the presence in
the United States, as in England, of income inequality, vast numbers of
people in the U.S. (unlike in England) owned property and thus had a
greater stake in society. This large American middle class demanded
easier divorce methods to enable them to change and legitimize family
relationships and clarify ownership ofproperty.116
Judicial divorces became available towards the end of the eighteenth
century, beginning with the New England states. 117 By 1867, thirty112

GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 238. See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAW 179-84 ( 1973).
11 3 See June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology,
Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REv. 953, 971-72 (1991). See also,
NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 31-32 (1962). Blake notes that, like the English Parliament, early state
legislatures granted special Acts of divorce only to those with wealth and power. !d. at
31.
114 FRIEDMAN, supra note ll2, at 179-84.
115 HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 86-87 (2000). Hartog,
in his legal history of marriage in the U.S. from 1790 to 1950, emphasizes that many
husbands and wives worked outside the law to end their marriages. First, many entered
into separation agreements, which, he argues, were not merely a private contractual form
of divorce. Instead, separation agreements resolved conflict within marriages by
providing a mechanism that allowed a married couple to live apart. Second, one (or
both) of the partners would simply move away and remarry. See id. at 76-92. Hartog
notes that "[b]igamy or, rather, serial monogamy (without divorce or death) was a
common social experience in early America." !d. at 87. Many who ended marriages in
this way were poor people, for whom the property rights allocated at formal divorce held
little concern. !d.
11 6 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 182-84.
117 See id. at 182. "Pennsylvania passed a general divorce law in 1785, Massachusetts
one year later. Every New England state had a divorce law before 1800, along with New
York, New Jersey, and Tennessee." !d. The southern states, and some oftheir neighbors,
were slower to eliminate legislative divorce. Both Virginia and Maryland did away with
the practice in 1851; Delaware was the last state to do away with legislative divorce in
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three of thirty-seven American jurisdictions provided for judicial
divorce. 118 With this increased availability, the divorce rate began to
rise steeply in the mid-nineteenth century. This rising pattern of divorce
continued into the twentieth century. 119
Despite its increased accessibility, it wasn't until the mid-twentieth
century that divorce by simple consent of the parties became
available. 120 Before then, all states required a showing of significant
misbehavior by one of the parties before a court would permit a couple
to divorce. 121 Only an "innocent" spouse whose partner had committed
adultery, abuse, or some other grave malfeasance would be granted a
divorce. Unhappy couples who both wanted divorce, or who had simply
given up on their marriages, frequently colluded to present divorce suits
as the fault of one or the other of them in order to terminate their
marriages. By the end of the nineteenth century, collusive divorces
became the norm. 122 A different "dual law of divorce" has thus been
described by Max Rheinstein as existing in the U.S. at that time: a
formal statutory law that granted divorce only as punishment for serious

1897. See Lawrence Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical
Perspective, 63 OR. L. REv. 649, 652 (1984) [hereinafter Friedman, Rights ofPassage].
ll8 GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 251.
119 See Max Rheinstein, The Law ofDivorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9
VAND. L. REv. 633, 633 n.2 (1956). In 1867, the number of divorces per 100 marriages
was approximately 2.8; in 1890, 5.8; in 1910, 8.8; in 1930; 17.4; and in 1949, 25.1. /d.
See also, Naomi Cahn, Faithless Wives and Lazy Husbands: Gender Norms in
Nineteenth-Century Divorce Law, 2002 U. ILL L. REv. 651, 659 (2002) ("A history of
divorce shows that the transition to our 'divorce culture' began during the nineteenth
century, rather than during the 1960's ..."). During the period between 1870 and 1880,
the rate of divorce increased by approximately 80%; in the following decade, the divorce
rate grew by 66.6%. !d. at 659 n.42. See also, BLAKE, supra note 113, at 134-36.
120 See Kay, supra note 106 at 56.
121 Permissible grounds for divorcing one' s spouse included adultery, bigamy,
desertion, extreme cruelty, habitual drunkenness, and conviction of a felony. BLAKE,
supra note 113, at 141-42. In addition, judges were permitted to take guilt or fault into
account when granting divorce and ordering property division and alimony. !d. at 237; J.
HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF
DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 44-45 (1997).
122 See, e.g., Friedman, Rights of Passage, supra note 117, at 659 (declaring that, in
virtually every state, the "main element [of its divorce court] was simply collusion,
between husband and wife, lawyers, and judges"). See also Herma Hill Kay, An
Appraisal of California 's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 291, 299 (1987)
(arguing that the adoption of no-fault grounds for divorce reflected a desire to " free the
administration of justice ... from the hypocrisy and perjury that had resulted from the
use of marital fault as a controlling consideration in divorce proceedings.").

340

Virginia Journal ofSocial Policy & the Law

[Vol. 11:3

marital misconduct and a liberal law that in practice amounted to divorce
by consent. 123
In 1969, California became the first state to replace its fault-based
system with no-fault divorce. 124 All states have since followed suit and
have adopted some version of the no-fault regime. 125 The current
availability in all states of no-fault divorce rules now ensures a relatively
facile exit from the bonds of marriage should either party so desire.
Critics blame the no-fault regimes for having cheapened and
destabilized marital commitment, making marriages "practically
terminable at will." 126 Some family theorists see the adoption of nofault divorce as having contributed to, if not precipitated, contemporary
marital instability. 127 Echoing the economic conception of family by
Gary Becker, Allen Parkman has argued that some barrier to exit is
necessary in order for the gains from specialization within marriage to
be realized. Those gains will not be realized, for instance, if a wife

123 MAx RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND THE LAW 51 (1972). See
also, Henna Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of
Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88
CAL. L. REv. 2017,2046-48 (2000).
124 The California Family Law Act of 1969 defined irreconcilable differences as
grounds for divorce. Family Law Act,§ 8, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3324 (current version at Cal.
Civ. Code§ 2311 (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1994)). See also Kay, supra note 106, at 299300. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act that accompanied the adoption of no-fault
grounds provides that "[I]f both of the parties have stated under oath or affirmation that
the marriage is irretrievably broken .. . the court, after hearing, shall make a fmding
whether the marriage is irretrievably broken." UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT§
305, 9A U.L.A. 21, 211 (1987). See also Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A
Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CrNN. L. REV. I, 44-51 (1987)
(discussing the legislative history behind the Act).
125 South Dakota was the last state to change its laws, adding no-fault grounds to its
divorce laws in 1985. S.D. Codified laws § 25-4-2(7). See also Friedman, Rights of
Passage, supra note 117, at 659, describing the total triumph of no-fault divorce over
fault-based systems: "[S]uddenly, the dam seemed to burst in divorce law. Twenty years
ago, consensual divorce was a radical idea. Today, it is unquestioned fact. The old
system collapsed completely; no-fault rushed into the vacuum. California was a pioneer
state, but no-fault is now the rule almost everywhere."
126 See, e.g., Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Law and Chastity, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 643,
712 (2001).
127 See, e.g., BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 3-13 (1997);
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law, Marriage, and Intimate Commitment, 9 VA. J. Soc. PoL'v &
L. 116 (2001) (arguing that the state is justified in promoting marital stability as a
substantive good). See also Scott, supra note 59, at 1905.
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holds up her part of the bargain and thus becomes more vulnerable, yet
her husband is free to walk away and benefit from doing so. 128
Rather than causing them, adoption of no-fault regimes primarily
reflected changing social norms that viewed lifelong marriage as merely
aspirational and divorce as a real option available to those whose
marriages were, for whatever reason, no longer functional. \29 Evidence
shows that, while Americans continue to take marital commitment
seriously, they also remain wary of legislative efforts designed to
reinforce that commitment. 130 Historical experience with first legislative
and then fault-based judicial divorce illustrates that unhappy couples
will resort to non-legal means, or manipulate available legal
mechanisms, to end dysfunctional unions. The higher the state places
the bar, the higher people will jump.
By putting the decision to terminate a marriage in the hands of
individuals, the state has reduced its involvement in the companionate
function of marriage. In doing so, it has arguably signaled the
increasingly limited scope of its interest in this function. There are other
indications of limited state involvement in the companionate function of
marriage. For instance, other than the imposition (in some states) of a
nominal waiting period between obtaining a license to marry and the
marriage ceremony, the state remains uninvolved in assuring the
compatibility of the marrying couple. 131 Although there continues to be
significant state intervention in and regulation of the economic
consequences of divorce (as well as its effect on dependent children),
there is currently no serious effort to restrict an individual's right to
separate from or divorce her spouse. Indeed, as with other contracts for
128

ALLEN M. PARKMAN, NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 78 (1992).
Parkman believes that, without requiring mutual consent as a minimal prerequisite for
divorce, no-fault regimes would lead to women refusing to make the "efficient" choice
of staying home to rear their children. !d.
129 June Carbone argues that "so potentially radical a set of reforms could sweep the
fifty states in such a short time only because the conception of marriage on which fault
was based had been obsolete for at least half a century." June Carbone, Income Sharing:
Redefining the Family in Terms ofCommunity, 31 Hous. L. REv. 359, 367 (1994). See
also, Laurence Drew Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage,
102 COLUM. L. REv. 1089, 1091-92 (2002) (highlighting shifting cultural attitudes
toward state regulation of marriage as a means of ordering individual sexual activity).
130 Scott, supra note 59, at 1902-03.
131
As discussed in Part Ill. A above, states no longer require publication of a couple's
intent to marry, a requirement that facilitated community policing of individuals' entry
into marriage. See supra notes 58-99 and accompanying text.
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services that are not specifically enforced, there is real discomfort with
the idea of state enforcement of an intimate relationship against either or
both parties' wilJ.I32
The normative question remains: should the state more actively
enforce--or reinforce-a couple's commitment to remain together? Is
there a connection between lifelong companionship and the public
welfare? In theory, states could impose any number of additional
barriers to divorce, including extending waiting (or "cooling off')
periods; requiring couples to undergo counseling or mediation; 133 or
reimposing fault-based divorce or otherwise limiting the grounds upon
which divorce will be granted.
Milton Regan and Elizabeth Scott are among the few legal scholars
who have directly addressed the state's interest and role in the purely
companionate aspects of the marital relationship. They both see the
preservation of marital commitment-even among couples with no
children and with comparable financial resources-as a societal good in
and of itself. 134 They argue that individuals have a "natural" preference
for long-term commitment, which can be thwarted by short-term
pressures. 135 Regan believes that the ability to make and keep
commitments is critical to the "unity of the self," but because of societal
pressures, individuals' ability to keep commitments becomes more
tenuous and weakens over time. 136 The state should thus help
individuals realize their preferences by "shaping the payoff matrices for
132 In the two states that have enacted covenant marriage statutes, compliance with
those acts is optional--couples may elect to enter into covenant or non-covenant
marriage. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-901 (2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272 (West
1998).
133 Florida, for example, passed and then repealed legislation in the 1990s that
required divorcing couples to undergo counseling and pursue mediation alternatives. See
FLA. STAT. ch. 39.428 (repealed 1996).
134 See, e.g., Regan, supra note 127 at 130 ("[C]ommitment is a good that society
should actively promote because of its essential role in realizing the deeply-rooted
as~iration that individuals lead lives that they can call their own.").
13
See Regan, supra note 127; Scott, supra note 59.
136 The primary societal pressures which Regan discusses are: ( 1) time-space
compression (i.e., pervasive and rapidly-changing stimuli in entertainment and other
areas of life move us from one context to another; and technologies like cell phones and
e-mail result in individuals' being, in a sense, in more than one place at a time while
engaging simultaneously in mu\tiple activities); 2) an ethos of mass consumer society;
and 3) the ascendance of flexible production methods designed to respond rapidly to
changes in consumer demand but which also introduce more risk and impermanence in
workplace relationships. See Regan, supra note 127, at 132-40.
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different types of behavior" and thus enhancing individuals' ability to
resist these influences. State intervention that makes exit from marriage
more difficult, according to Regan, furthers the general happiness and
well-being ofthe citizenry.I37
This approach to family policy, however, has serious drawbacks.
Not only does such a proposal smack of paternalism, but the assumption
that people have "natural" preferences for long-term commitment is a
troubling one in which to ground a policy decision. Such a proposal
relies on a conception of individuals' preferences that is too narrow and
uncertain to justify state action. Regan's proposal gives too little
consideration to the powerful forces that create and shape preferences.
For example, to the extent that the observation may be descriptively
accurate, it is impossible to identify how much of that preference is truly
innate and universal, and how much reflects individuals' internalization
of legal and majority social norms that trumpet the propriety and
"naturalness" of that preference. 138 Second, "long-term" itself can be
variable: for one individual, "long-term" may be a commitment of five
or seven years; for another, it may indeed be lifelong processes. Finally,
even if individuals "prefer" long-term commitment, measures that
attempt to enforce such commitments ignore the fact that individuals'
development of identity and autonomy may be lifelong. Because an
individual may change and develop over time, it is not clear why an
individuals' stated preference at year one should outweigh her
preference, informed by tim e and experience, at year five, ten, or
twenty. Such a change of heart should be insufficient to invalidate a
commercial contract, of course. But allowing easy exit from unhappy
marriage does not preclude the state from enforcing other commitments
made by couples (e.g., economic commitments made by couples to each
other, economic and caretaking commitments made to third party
dependents, and so on.).
It may indeed be true that we are social beings and most of us crave
companionship and some type of stability in our intimate relationships.
137
138

See id. at 123-24.
It is arguably not possible to identify the extent to which social ideologies shape
law, or vice versa. As Nancy Cort points out in the introduction to her recent book on
the history of marriage, "[llaw and society stand in a circular relation: social demands
put pressure on legal practices, while at the same time the law' s public authority frames
what people can envision for themselves .. ." NANCY F. Con, PUBLIC Vows: A
HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 8 (2000) [hereinafter Con, PUBLIC VOWS].
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Nevertheless, I wonder whether most of us would agree ex ante to the
state's intervening to 'save' our marital relationships at some future date,
should our current commitment to remain with our chosen partner falter.
I think not. Such intervention violates deeply-imbedded principles of
autonomy and self-determination.
Scott also proposes legal reforms that explicitly link spousal
commitment with parental commitment, reinforcing spouses'
commitment to stay together "for the sake of the children." 139 Scott
questions why "legal commitment [is] associated with choice in
contract, but with coercion in marriage;" 140 she might simply be
answered thus: enforcement of the marriage contract forces continued
intimacy, cohabitation, affection, and sex. It is also worth noting that
enforcement of many contracts, including contracts for services, calls for
the payment of damages rather than specific performance of the
contract. 141 When adults no longer wish to be intimately associated with
each other, principles of privacy and self-determination require that the
state not force their continued association.
Scott grounds her proposal on "accumulating evidence"
demonstrating the harmful impact of divorce on children. 142 That
evidence, however, is more ambiguous than Scott and others would
139

Scott, supra note 59, at 1962-66. According to Scott, strong historic associations
between spousal commitment norms and "unpopular" gender norms have rendered legal
reforms enforcing spousal commitment norms politically unfeasible. She argues that
linking spousal commitment instead with parental commitment might avoid the negative
"bundling" effect. /d.
140 /d. at 1903.
141 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 cmt. a (1981) (noting that
refusal to resort to specific performance is based in part upon a reluctance to compel the
continuance of personal association after disputes have arisen and relationships have
likely deteriorated; also upon the reluctance to compel what might have the appearance
of involuntary servitude).
142 Scott, supra note 59, at 1965. Some sociologists have concluded that the spread of
divorce and single-parent families contributes to many social problems, including
poverty, crime, substance abuse, declining academic standards, and the erosion of
neighborhoods and communities. See generally Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in
the 1990's: An Update of the Amato & Keith (1991) Meta-Analysis, 15 JOURNAL OF
FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY 355 (2001) (concluding that "[c]ompared with children with
continuously married parents, children with divorced parents continued to score
significantly lower on measures of academic achievement, conduct, psychological
adjustment, self-concept, and social relations."). See also E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON AND
JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED (2002); JUDITH S.
WALLERSTEIN, SANDRA BLAKESLEE, AND JULIA M. LEWIS, THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF
DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK STUDY (2000).

2004]

Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy

345

suggest. 143 Sociological data suggest that factors other than parents'
divorce (including parents' continuing high-conflict marriages) hurt
children. Studies have shown that children's well-being is more
dependent on the level of family conflict than on the type of family
structure. 144 Sociologists have also found that children can develop
successfully in a variety of family structures, and that a number of other
factors pose more serious threats to the well-being of adults and children
than does marital instability, including poverty, abuse, neglect, poorly
funded schools, and a lack of government services. 145 We should reject
such approaches, which detract from alternative measures that should be
implemented to strengthen parental and societal support for all children,
regardless of the marital status of their parents. l46
C. "To Forsake All Others": Sex and Procreation

Historically, legal and extralegal norms dictated that sex and
procreation take place exclusively within the marital relationship. 147
The state considers sex to be both essential and-ideally-exclusive to
the marital contract. As recently as 1964, one court declared that the
"standards of society are such that sexual relations or lascivious actions
by persons who do not have the benefit of marriage to one another are
regarded as obscene, unchaste and immora1." 148 Sexual intercourse is an
implied term of the marriage contract; most states' statutory or common
143 For instance, one sociologist has pointed out that, in order to more accurately
examine the impact of divorce on children, researchers should compare children of
divorce not with children of all married parents, but with children of unhappily married
parents who do not divorce. JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHfNKING
FAMILY VALUES fN THE POSTMODERN AGE 60 ( 1996).
144 /d.
145 See generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERJCAN
FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 207-231 (2d. ed. 2000). In her introduction to the
2nd edition of her book, Coontz notes the drop in recent years in violent crime and teen
pregnancy and observes that, "[i]f divorce and unwed motherhood were the primary
causes of crime and teen pregnancy, then these certainly would not have decreased in
recent years, since the number of children raised in one-parent homes have continued to
climb." /d. at xxvii. See also, Paul R. Amato, Diversity Within Single-Parent Families,
in THE HANDBOOK OF FAMILY DIVERSITY 149-172 (David H. Demo, Katherine R. Allen,
& Mark A. Fine, eds., 2000); JUDITH STACEY, supra note 142, at 60. Stacey discusses
"statistical tricks" used by some researchers "to exaggerate advantages some children
from two-parent families enjoy over their single-parented peers." /d.
146 The issues concerning marriage and the caretaking of dependents will be taken up
in Part III.D., infra.
147 See GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 64-152; Carbone, supra note 5, at 269-70.
148 State v. Jones, 205 A.2d 507,509 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964).
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law grants annulment149 of a marriage upon showing of one party's
impotence, provided that the condition was unknown to the other party
at the time of marriage. 15° Some states also consider impotence a
ground for divorce. 151 Notably, marriage is one of exceedingly few
contracts where the state permits sex to be an essential term. Indeed,
most contracts in which sex is an essential term are void on public policy
grounds. 152
Nevertheless, the pervasive and widespread contemporary
acceptance of nonmarital sex strongly indicates that the public's notion
of marriage as a necessary prerequisite to sex has eroded. Even more
compelling than shifting public opinion, though, are developing notions
of individuals' right to privacy, evident most recently in the Supreme
Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas. 153 In Lawrence, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a Texas statute that made it a crime for two
persons of the same sex to engage in intimate sexual conduct was
unconstitutional, as applied to adult males who had engaged in a
consensual act of sodomy in the privacy of the home. 154 In its opinion,
the Court cited an "emerging awareness" over the past half century that
149 Annulment is a judgment that a marriage is invalid due to the existence of some
impediment at its formation. Because of state policy encouraging the permanence of
marriage, annulments are not easily granted. Bigamous marriages and marriages
between couples sharing an impermissible degree of consanguinity are generally
considered void (never valid). Marriages that include fraud, physical incapacity, absence
of legal capacity to consent (due to age or mental incapacity) or force or duress are
generally considered voidable (able to be invalidated). See Albert Momjian, Annulment,
in l FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE§§ 5.02, 5.03 (Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 2003).
150 E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2210(t) (West 1994) (permitting annulment where one
spouse is "physically incapable of entering the marriage state"); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/301(2) (West 1999) (permitting annulment where spouse "lacks the physical
capacity to consummate the marriage"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-l (West 2000)
(permitting annulment upon showing that spouse is "incurably impotent"); N.Y. DoM.
REL. LAW§§ 7(3), l40(d) (McKinney 1999) (permitting annulment where one spouse is
"incapable of entering into the married state from physical causes"); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN.§ 6.106 (Vernon 1998) (permitting annulment upon a showing of"[i]mpotency").
151 E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § l (Law. Co-op. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 935-l (1994).
152 See, e.g., Updeck v. Samuel, 123 Cal.App.2d 264, 267 P.2d 822 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1954); Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 95 Cal.App.2d 599, 602, 213 P.2d 727 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
153 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
154 Id. Overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Lawrence Court
acknowledged that individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical
relationships are a form of liberty and hence, the Texas statute impinged on the exercise
ofliberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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the liberty interest affords substantial protection through the nation's
laws and traditions to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.
Constitutional privacy doctrine thus dictates state noninterference
with adults' consensual sexual relationships, whether or not those
relationships have been formalized through marriage. The repeal or
non-enforcement of criminal statutes prohibiting consensual sex acts
between adults 155 that began in the late twentieth century and continued
through the decision in Lawrence illustrates the state's gradual retreat
from its historical role of policing and enforcing sexuality.IS6 The
prevalence of nonmarital sex coupled with explicit judicial and
I 55 Eight states continue to have sodomy laws in effect that apply to both opposite-sex
and same-sex acts: Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Utah and Virginia. Also, only three states had same-sex sodomy statutes that had not
been abolished either legislatively or by judicial pronouncement: Kansas, Oklahoma and
Texas. See, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND
THELAW9-ll {2001 Supp.).
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence, many states had recognized the
sexual privacy right by abolishing their sodomy statutes. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 349
Ark. 600 (2002) (holding that Arkansas's criminal sodomy statute, which applied only to
same-sex couples, violated the state privacy and equal protection rights of same-sex
couples engaging in private, consensual, noncommercial sexual activity); Doe v.
Ventura, 2001 WL 543734 (Minn. May 15, 2001) (declaring sodomy law
unconstitutional, with state trial court certifying a class action to give the ruling
statewide effect); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (declaring state sodomy law
unconstitutional); Gryczan v. Montana, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (declaring sodomy
law unconstitutional as violation of state constitution's right to privacy); Campbell v.
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. App. 1996) (declaring sodomy law unconstitutional
on state constitutional privacy grounds); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487
(Ky. 1992) (declaring sodomy law unconstitutional); Michigan Org. for Human Rights v.
Kelley, N0.88-815820 CZ, slip op. at 12 (Wayne Cnty. Cir. Ct. 1990) (unpublished) (no
appeal taken) (declaring sodomy laws unconstitutional as to "activities between
consenting adults taking place in the privacy of one's home."). But see State v. Smith,
766 So. 2d 501 (La. 2000) (upholding sodomy law that applies to both opposite-sex and
same-sex acts); City of Topeka v. Movsovitz, 960 P.2d 267 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998)
(upholding sodomy law that criminalizes only same-sex acts).
The Court's decision in Lawrence, then, rather than breaking with majority popular
opinion, reflects an extant belief in the privacy due adult sexual acts. As noted by
Supreme Court Justice O'Connor in a collection of essays published shortly before the
Court's decision in Lawrence came down, "rare indeed is the legal victory-in court or
legislature-that is not a careful byproduct of an emerging social consensus." SANDRA
DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW 166 (Craig Joyce, ed. 2003).
156 In his concurring opinion in Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 641 (2002), Justice
Robert L. Brown, joined by Justice Jim Hannah, emphasized his agreement with the
national trend "to curb government intrusions at the threshold of one's door and most
definitely at the threshold of one's bedroom." !d.
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legislative recogmt10n of sexual privacy threatens the privileging of
marital sex and mitigates societal attempts to control sexuality. 157
Like sex, procreation has long been considered to be one of the
primary purposes of marriage. 158 The Supreme Court has described
marriage as "basic to the perpetuation of a race" 159 and "fundamental to
our very existence and survival." 160 June Carbone notes that marriage
could only be considered fundamental to our very existence if it were
viewed as a necessary precondition to procreation. 161 But, as with sex,
there has been a growing acknowledgement of the notion that
individuals should make procreative decisions free of government
intervention.
The state's role in policing procreation was more explicit in the past
than it is today. Indeed, evidence suggests that prior to the second half
of the 1900s, there was intense public and private pressure not to bear or
157

This is not to imply, of course, that state recognition of sexual and procreative
privacy is either complete or necessarily permanent. See, e.g., Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003 18 U.S.C.A. §1531(b)(l)(A) (2003) (prohibiting intact dilation and
extraction abortions); Editorial, The War Against Women, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, §
4, at 14 (arguing that Bush administration's "anti-choice crusade"-its attempts to block
women's access to contraceptives--constitutes an assault on reproductive rights that
threatens women's constitutional liberty and denies them essential reproductive health
care); Robin Toner, At a Distance, Bush Joins Abortion Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2003, at Al6 (quoting President George W. Bush as telling thousands of abortion
protesters that he shared their commitment to "protect the lives of innocent children
waiting to be born.").
158 Unlike state treatment of impotence, however, no state permits annulment of a
marriage based on a spouse's infertility. See 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce & Separation §
122 (2003) ("Inability to beget or bear children, if associated with complete power of
coeulation, is not a ground for dissolving a marriage.").
15
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,536 (1942).
160 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Until the mid-twentieth century, courts
tended to treat marriage, sex, and procreation as virtually interchangeable. The courts
knew, of course, that procreation was possible outside marriage. But these opinions
illustrate the deeply-held social aversion to having children born to unmarried parents. A
New York Court in 1926 stated, for example:
[T]he refusal of husband or wife without any adequate excuse to have
ordinary marriage relations with the other party to the contract strikes at
the basic obligations springing from the marriage contract, when viewed
from the standpoint of the State and of society at large. However much
this relationship may be debased at times it nevertheless is the foundation
upon which must rest the perpetuation of society and civilization. If it is
not to be maintained we have the alternatives either of no children or of
illegitimate children, and the State abhors either result.
Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605, 607 (N.Y. 1926).
161 Carbone, supra note 5, at 274.
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raise children outside of marriage. 162 In the late eighteenth century,
common mechanisms of control included not only the legal impediments
imposed on illegitimate children, 163 but also "shotgun" marriages,
adoption, and even abortion. During this period, reports indicate that
one out of three New England brides was pregnant at the time of

marriage. 164 These notions of state control of and regulation of the
procreative process were briefly challenged in the mid-nineteenth
century, when cornmunitarian and "free-love" alternatives were
perceived to threaten traditional monogamy, as was the social instability
caused by the massive casualties and upheaval of the Civil W ar. 165 Such
rebellion was short-lived, however. The late nineteenth century
witnessed a reactionary "moral panic" over family life, which led to
concerted efforts to reinforce traditional marital mores. 166
The mid-twentieth century saw the beginnings of a heightened
respect for reproductive privacy. In the first decision to explicitly
articulate a fundamental right to privacy, the Supreme Court held in
Griswold v. Connecticut that government had no place in the procreative
decisions of married couples, invalidating a state law that criminalized
the use of contraceptive devices. 167 Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, considered hypothetical enforcement measures under the law and
found that "[t]he very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship." 168
A few years later in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended Griswold to protect the
162

GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 196-201.
/d.
164 See Sylvia A. Law, supra note 145, at 184.
165 Corr, supra note 78, at 105-31 ("Traditional monogamy appeared to need
bolstering after the Civil War. Communitarian and free love alternatives had bedeviled
the institution in the 1850s; then wartime disasters threatened known ways of life.").
166
See, e.g.. GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 83-84 ("In nineteenth-century American
domestic relations, panics over family life led to persistent efforts to compel deviant
couples to adhere to orthodox republican matrimonial practices."). Passage of the
Comstock Act in 1873, for example, arose from a desire to confine sexuality to the
marital relationship. The Act criminalized the use of the mails to circulate "obscene,
lewd or lascivious" materials, which included articles intended "for preventing
conception or producing abortion, or for indecent or immoral use." The law was
interpreted to apply to the marketing of birth control devices. XVII U.S. STATUTES AT
LARGE, 598-600 (George P. Sanger ed., 1873). Following the passage of the Comstock
Act, approximately half of the states passed "little Comstock laws" making contraceptive
devices illegal. See, GROSSBERG, supra note 5, at 175-78; COTI, Puauc Vows, supra
note 78, at 124-25.
167 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U .S. 479 (1965).
168
/d. at 486.
163
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procreative privacy of unmarried persons as well as married couples. In
Eisenstadt 169 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law that made it a
felony for anyone other than a physician or pharmacist to dispense
contraceptives to unmarried persons. Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, reasoned simply that "whatever the rights of the individual to
contraception may be, the rights must be the same for the married and
unmarried alike." 170 Thus, "[i]fthe right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 171
The state has therefore taken a number of steps to extricate itself
from individuals' procreative decisions, within and outside of marriage.
The elimination of legal distinctions between marital and nonmarital
children, 172 the availability of contraceptives, 173 and access to
abortion 174 all illustrate both the separation of procreation from marriage
and the limited nature of the state's interest in those decisions. 175
169 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
170 Id. at 453 .
171 Id.
172 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (permitting child of unmarried
parents to inherit from father as well as mother, once paternity proven); Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973) (imposing duty to support child on both unmarried parents, once
paternity proven); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding unconstitutional a
state's creating a cause of action in favor of a child of married parents for the wrongful
death of a parent but excluding from the same cause of action a child born of unmarried
parents). Beginning with Levy, the Supreme Court established an intermediate scrutiny
standard to determine the constitutionality of statutes distinguishing between children of
married and unmarried parents. See id.
173 See, Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (striking down a Connecticut law criminalizing the
distribution of contraceptives to married individuals); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55
(striking down a Massachusetts law criminalizing the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried individuals).
174 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the right to privacy to
include a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding
unconstitutional the Pennsylvania requirement that a married woman seeking an abortion
inform her husband of her intent and produce a signed statement that she has done so,
but upholding a state's imposition of a 24-hour waiting period and parental notification
provision with judicial bypass in same statute); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)
(holding unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting both dilation and evacuation and
dilation and extraction abortion procedures).
The federal government refuses to include abortion among the procedures covered by
Medicaid, the federally subsidized health insurance program for the poor. See, e.g. ,
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (permitting an amendment to the federal Medicaid
Act prohibiting use of Medicaid payments for non-therapeutic abortions); Webster v.
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But some of the privacy guarantees afforded by constitutional
privacy doctrine can be waived, and poor people who receive certain
types of government assistance-the vast majority of whom are
women 176-must do just that. The Supreme Court has held, for instance,
that because families do not have a per se entitlement to government
assistance, the government may require families receiving assistance to
submit to inspection and state intervention in many intimate aspects of
their family and private lives in order to qualify for benefits.177
The 1996 Welfare legislation introduced a number of measures
designed to modify poor women's sexual and reproductive behavior. 178
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding a state statute prohibiting
any public employee from assisting in any abortion not necessary to save the mother' s
life).
l75 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55.
176 In 1997, 96.4 percent of welfare recipients were women with children. Pamela J.
Loprest & Shelia R. Zedlewski, Current and Former Welfare Recipents: How Do They
D.jffer?, Urban Institute Discussion Paper 99-17 at 3 (November 1999).
1
See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (upholding regulation under Aid
to Families with Dependent Children welfare program determining families' eligibility
for benefits despite negative effects on families' chosen living arrangements); Lyng v.
Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a provision in the
federal food stamp program that presumed certain household members functioned as a
single economic unit); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (rejecting a welfare
recipient's right to refuse a state home inspection as a condition of welfare eligibility).
178 See generally Wendy Chavkin et al., Sex, Reproduction, and Welfare Reform, 7
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & PoL'Y 379 (2000), for review and criticism of the 1996 Act's
efforts to modify sexual and reproductive behaviors through a series of economic
disincentives. The authors argue that Family Cap Provisions (which prevent increases in
assistance to mothers who bear additional children while already receiving welfare
benefits) have no significant effect on childbearing. Other such policies have been
similarly ineffective, including family planning mandates, abstinence education, and
other policies aimed at decreasing nonmarital births. Instead of addressing the problem
of poverty, the authors posit that these sorts of policies focus on individual sexual and
reproductive behaviors in a manner that is both unethical and ineffective.
In addition, in all states, women must identify the father (or potential father/fathers) of
her children and cooperate with state child support collection efforts in order to establish
or maintain eligibility for benefits. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-617 (2004), Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103,
110 Stat. 2105, 2135 (1996). Every state, in order to comply with federal law, must enact
legislation that makes cooperation with paternity identification and child support
enforcement a condition of eligibility. Any state that fails to enact and enforce this
requirement will lose up to five percent of its total block grant. Id. Sixteen states require
that welfare recipients be given information to promote family planning (initiated by the
state agency rather than the participant) or require that they attend family planning
counseling sessions. IOWA CODE ANN.§ 2398.10 (6) (West 2000); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:447.1 (West 2000); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3788 (14) (West 2000); MD.
CODE ANN. Art. 88A § 49(a)(4)(ii) (2000); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 118 § 1 (110)(I)(4)(i)-

352

Virginia Journal ofSocial Policy & the Law

[Vol. 11:3

For example, to discourage poor women from having additional
children, twenty-three states subject families to "family cap" measures.
These measures reduce or eliminate any benefit increase for mothers
who have additional children while on welfare. 179
The principles underlying constitutional privacy doctrine require that
individuals be permitted to make procreative decisions free from
government interference or coercion. Without the modest increase
provided for additional family members, however, government
implicitly regulates procreation among those receiving assistance
because parents who do have additional children are forced to support
their families at a level even further below the poverty line (at which the
level of support is, by definition, inadequate). 180 The family cap
threatens women who have additional children with even deeper

(iv) (Law. Co-op. 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-1722 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. 422.284
(2000); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§§ 350, 409-1 (McKinney 2000); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
5107.72 (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-5-24, 43-5-1120 (D) (Law. Co-op. 2000);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-3-701 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1106(7) (2000); VA.
CODE ANN.§ 63.1-133.45 (Michie 2000); WASH. REv. CODE§ 74.12.400(4) (2000); W.
VA. CODE§ 9-9-9 (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.159, 49.19 (11 s)(d) (West 2000).
Three states encourage poor women to relinquish their children for adoption. UTAH CODE
ANN.§ 35A-3-308(4) (1997); VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.1-133.45 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE§§ 74.12.255(4), 74.04.005 (2001).
179 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 46-292 (West 2000); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§
11450.04 (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 17b-112 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ch.
414.115 (2000); GA. CODE ANN.§ 49-4-186 (2000); 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-2 (2000);
MD. CODE ANN. Art. 88A §50 (2001); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 118, § 1 (Lexis Supp.
2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-17-5 (1) (2000); NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-1724 (2)(b) (2000);
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 44:10-61 (West 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 50-09-29 (2001); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 56,§ 230.58 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 43-5-1175 (Law. Co-op. 2000); TENN.
CODE ANN.§ 71-3-154 (I) (2000); VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.1-105.7 (Michie 2000); WIS.
STAT. ANN.§ 49.19 (lls)(b) (West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 42-2-103 (e)(iii) (Michie
2001); ARK. DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVS., TRANSITIONAL EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE
MANUAL,§ 2150.1 (1999), available at
http://www.state.ar.us/dhs/webpolicy!fEA%20Po1icy!fEA_TOC.htm; Del. Code Regs.
§§ 8000, 8205.2, 8301.3; § 3008.2 DEL. Soc. SERVS. MANUAL§ 40-800-005 (2000); IND.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 470, r. 14-2-2 (2000); N.C. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
NORTH CAROLINA'S T ANF STATE PLAN, Appendix Cat 26 (1999), available at
h~://www.dhhs.state.nc.us/docs/wtp1an.pdf.

18

In addition, Dorothy Roberts argues that these laws reflect "the view that

childbearing by poor women is pathological and should be deterred through social
policy." Dorothy Roberts, Welfare's Ban on Poor Motherhood, 152, 153, in WHOSE
WELFARE? (Gwendolyn Mink ed. 1999).
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poverty; its very purpose is to affect women's decisions to procreate.
And only the poor are sanctioned in this manner. 181
The state's focus on reducing nonmarital childbearing by women
receiving public assistance is wrongheaded at best, unlawful at worst.
The Supreme Court has extended constitutional protection to
individuals' procreative decisions, and that protection should not be
contingent on parents' and would-be parents' economic status. Efforts
to reduce poor women's fertility subjects them, because of their poverty,
to state intrusion that most of us would consider a violation of our
privacy.
In 1994, the United States, along with 179 other countries, signed
the Programme of Action at the International Conference on Population
and Development in Cairo, Egypt. 182 That document states that
reproductive rights include the individual's "right to make decisions
concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and
violence." 183 Yet the family cap and other measures instituted through
welfare reform are nothing if not coercive. Dorothy Roberts has
criticized many of the measures adopted as part of state welfare
programs, noting that "[t]his degree of government control over
reproductive decision-making would surely amount to a violation of
citizens' procreative liberty if imposed directly by law. Protection from
government intrusion of such deeply personal matters is ' [a]t the heart of
liberty. "'184
-

181

See, e.g., Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary
Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121 , 175-76 (2002).
Smith canvases the states' family cap provisions and concludes that:
Welfare recipients are the only citizens who are penalized by the government on the
basis of the number of their children . . . In other programs and taxation schemes, either
the size and structure of the family is ignored altogether-as it is in the Social Security
program-{)r parents are given additional benefits-such as taxation credits and tuition
assistance packages-when they have more children.
!d.
182

UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE QN POPULATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 171/13 (1994).
183 /d. at43.
184 Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J.
1563, 1582 (1996) (reviewing LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE
MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994) and JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF
WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994)). Roberts has also
suggested that, for African Americans, "social reproduction carries the added importance
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Second, attempts to reduce nonmarital childbearing are not only
wrongheaded, but also may well be doomed to fail. 185 Other policies
aimed at decreasing nonmarital births have been feckless, including
family planning mandates and abstinence education. 186 The question of
effectiveness may remain open--Qne researcher acknowledges that
family cap programs have so far eluded evaluation because of the
complexities that come with the fact that they "were implemented at the
same time as a broad set of other changes, any number of which could
impact on fertility behavior." 187 But there appears to be little reason to
expect that such policies will be effective in any significant way.
In general, while there has been some improvement in reducing nonmarital births in the 1990s, little of it can be attributed to welfare reform.
Among African-Americans (who are disproportionately represented
among welfare recipients), for instance, non-marital births dropped from
90.5 per thousand in 1990 to 73.3 per thousand in 1998, a decline of 19
percent. Almost all of the improvement, however, predated the 1996
legislation. 188
Government efforts to reduce childbearing by poor and unmarried
women bespeaks a distrust of the poor and a hostility to deviant family
forms, i.e., those without a male head of household. As Nancy Polikoff
has observed:
The imperative to find a legal father for every child provides
a convenient smokescreen, a diversion of energy and
resources from the possible solutions to children's real
problems. Targeting single motherhood, therefore, serves
the dual purpose of perpetuating patriarchal ideology and
exonerating the state from its obligation to provide children

of preserving cultural traditions under assault by the dominant society." Dorothy E.
Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 69-70 (1997).
185 See, e.g., Chavkin et. al., supra note 178, (reviewing and criticizing the 1996 Act's
efforts to modify sexual and reproductive behaviors through a series of economic
disincentives). The authors argue that family cap provisions have no significant effect
on childbearing. Instead of addressing the problem of poverty, the authors posit that
these sorts of policies focus on individual sexual and reproductive behaviors in a manner
that is both unethical and ineffective. /d. at 379.
186 see, e.g., l d. at 380.
187 Paul Offner, Reducing Non-Marital Births, in WELFARE REFORM AND BEYOND:
THE FuruRE OF THE SAFETY NET 148 (Isabel V. Sawhill et al. eds. 2002).
188 /d. at 149.
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with at least minimally adequate financial well-being, health
care, education and physical safety. 189
The trend in constitutional jurisprudence that treats individuals'
sexual relationships and procreative decisions-within and outside of
marriage-as deserving privacy is a correct one. For poor families,
ensuring procreative freedom and privacy means assuring them that their
procreative decisions will not have dire financial consequences for their
families. Legislative policy that rolls back those protections for poor
people runs counter to that goal. A better social policy would be one
that respects adult sexual and procreative privacy and is grounded in the
notion of civic responsibility for ensuring the welfare of all citizens.

D. "In Sickness and in Health": The Caretaking Function ofMarriage
Society currently designates the nuclear, preferably marital, family
as the social structure that supports child caretaking. 190 Yet caretaking
benefits not only those for whom care is provided, but also society
generally. 191 Our political system aspires that its citizens be capable of
participating in the political process.
Similarly, our economic
institutions require capable workers. The sick and elderly require care,
and we expect that today's young people will provide physical care to us
once we are elderly. We expect that they will be the future workers who
will fund our social security accounts, produce the goods to which we
have become accustomed, and fuel the economy upon which we rely. 192
Children can meet society's high expectations of them only if they
have been cared for while dependent; they must have received an
appropriate upbringing, as well as an adequate education. 193 The
189

Nancy D. Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction ofFamilies Without Fathers: Is It
an Option for Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 375, 394
~1996).

90 See, e.g., June Carbone, A Feminist Perspective on Divorce, 4 CHILD. & DIVORCE
186 (1994).
191 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare
"Reform," 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 287 (1996).
192 See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Accounting for Family Change, 89 GEO. L.J. 923,96869 (2001) (reviewing JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND
REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW (2000) ).

193 Dependents require caretaking. Martha Fineman has observed that "dependency is
both inevitable and universal ... (It} is inevitably associated with infancy and often
accompanies old age, illness, and many disabilities. Dependency is, therefore, a natural
part of all human experience." Fineman, supra note 191, at 292. Society thus requires
caretakers. And, to the extent that a caretaker is not paid (e.g., a mother taking care of
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successes and failures of child caretaking thus redound to society as a
whole.
Despite the tremendous public interest in dependents' care and
upbringing, the state's efforts to directly support dependent caretaking,
irrespective of the family structure within which it occurs, have been
anemic. The rhetorical importance placed on child caretaking in the
U.S. stands in stark contrast to family support policies that are the
stingiest in the industrial world. 194 The state countenances the virtual
nonexistence of subsidized child care, 195 the absence of mandated paid
parental leave, 196 and unsupportive or inflexible work schedules that
threaten parents and other caretakers with job loss, thus jeopardizing
their families' economic security. 197 Other supportive programs, like
those that would increase the length of the school day and year-both
offering children additional educational opportunities and providing
additional supervision for children during caretakers' work hours-have
not been widely implemented.
her child full-time), caretakers themselves (or, as Fineman calls them, "derivative
de,pendents") require support. See FINEMAN, supra note 32, at 161-163.
l9
See, e.g., STACEY, supra note 14, 46-48.
195 The absence of universal childcare and early childhood education programs forces
families, especially poor families, to spend an inordinately high percentage of their
earnings on often inadequate childcare. Families with incomes below the poverty line
spend a full 25% of their incomes on childcare. Families with incomes between 100%
and 125% of the poverty line spend 16% of their incomes on childcare. And non-poor
families spend, on average, 6% of their incomes on childcare. See JODY HEYMANN, THE
WIDENING GAP: WHY AMERICA'S WORKING FAMILIES ARE IN JEOPARDY AND WHAT CAN
BE DONE ABOUT IT 130 (2000). See also HEDIEH RAHMANOU, INST. FOR WOMEN'S
POLICY RESEARCH, THE WIDENING GAP: A NEW BOOK ON THE STRUGGLE TO BALANCE
WORK AND CAREGIVING, RESEARCH-IN BRIEF 3 (200 l ).
196 The Family Medical Leave Act [hereinafter FMLA] requires that only employers
with 50 or more workers provide them up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave upon the birth
or adoption of a child. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611, 2612(a) (2004). Approximately half of
workers in the U.S. are not covered under FMLA because they work for employers with
fewer than 50 workers, are part-time workers, or have recently changed jobs. COMM'N
ON LEAVE, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE PoLICIES, app. E, Table 5.H, 5.R (1996). Many families cannot afford to lose
twelve (or even fewer) weeks of income. Only 2 percent of workers have paid family
leave. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDlliM AND LARGE
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, 4 (1999). See generally, HEYMANN, supra note 195.
197 Many workers in the U.S., especially low-income workers, do not have workforce
benefits like paid leave or flexible work schedules that can make it economically feasible
for workers to meet their caretaking obligations. Only 32 percent of low-income
employees can choose their starting and quitting times. In that same group of lowincome employees, 71 percent are unable to take days off to care for sick children. See
HEYMANN, supra note 195, at 116.
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In contrast, other countries consistently do more to assist caretakers.
France and the Scandinavian countries are among those that have
implemented family support policies that directly support caretak:ing. 198
These policies include subsidized day care, paid parental leave, universal
health care, and income supplements to low-earning caretakers. At least
in part because of these measures, the child poverty rate in France, for
example, is just over five percent, compared to nearly twenty percent in
the U.S. 199 As Barbara Bergmann argues:
What is different [between the U.S. and France] is not
children's needs, but the sense of public responsibility for
the welfare of the nation's children, the feelings of
generosity toward those who are poor, the willingness to pay
taxes . . . . [T]he United States is an extremely wealthy
country, and one of the least taxed in the developed
world ... . A costly and activist program is the only way we
will be able to make progress against child poverty.200
Certainly, some families in the U.S. may receive different types of
support, depending on their family and caretaking structures. The state
supports some dependents indirectly through the subsidies and supports
provided to marital families, support that comes without
stigmatization. 201 Married couples receive more protections and benefits
198 See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, SAVING OUR CHll..DREN FROM POVERTY: WHAT THE
UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM FRANCE 117-119 ( 1996); STACEY, supra note 14, at
45-48.
199
BERGMANN, supra note 198, at 6.
200 BERGMANN, supra note 199, at 118, 151.
201 Despite its receipt of state subsidies, the myth of the "self~sufficient" and
"independent" marital family is pervasive. When these families perform more
successfully than other (unsubsidized) family forms, the myth is perpetuated. The fiction
of the independent family "masks or distorts the universal and extensive nature of
dependency in society. [These families'] subsidized existence solidifies the notion that
successful families manage dependency without resorting to the state." Martha Fineman,
Masking Dependency: The Political Role ofFamily Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REv. 2181,2213
(1995).
In response to a request from Congress to "identify federal laws in which benefits, rights
and privileges are contingent on marital status," the General Accounting Office
conducted a search and identified "1049 federal laws classified to the United States Code
in which marital status is a factor." General Accounting Office, Office of General
Counsel, GAO/OGC-97-16, Defense of Marriage Act 1-2 (1997).
Married couples benefit from favorable tax and inheritance laws and may receive
pension benefits, derivative social security benefits (which provide income to surviving
spouses of workers and veterans upon their deaths), derivative health insurance benefits,
and Medicare benefits (which ensure the availability of health care to spouses of insured
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than do nonmarital couples-social security, pension, and health
insurance benefits are among the measures that assist marital families. 202
While federal income tax laws currently require some two-earner marital
families to pay higher taxes than if they were to file singly, they do
benefit the family with one primary wage-earner and a stay-at-home
dependent spouse (or secondary wage-eamer).203 Thus, while all marital
individuals once the insured individuals reach age 62), as well as decision-making
authority in the case of their spouse's disability. Upon marrying, couples also acquire,
inter alia, property and inheritance rights, the right to spousal support, and the right to
preserve the confidentiality of marital communications. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44, 59 (Hawaii 1993) (offering a partial list of marital rights and benefits). See also 38
U.S.C. §1311 (Westlaw 2003); 42 U .S.C . §402 (Westlaw 2003); Nancy J . Knauer,
Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W.VA. L. REv. 129, 130-139, 143-184
(1998). See generally infra notes 202-208 and accompanying text.
Couples excluded from marriage rank the ability to file joint federal income tax returns
as one of the most significant benefits denied them; in "a same-sex couple where one
partner has considerably more income than the other, the inability to file jointly will
result in greater tax liability than a similarly situated married couple." Knauer, supra, at
165. See also I.R.C . § 6013 (Westlaw 2003). Other tax benefits provided to marital
couples include employer-provided fringe benefits, including health insurance, and
group-term life insurance; these are doubly tax-advantaged because of their exclusion
from an employee's gross income. Knauer, supra , at 169. See also I.R.C. §§ 106, 152
(Westlaw 2003). Married taxpayers also receive an unlimited deduction for inter vivos
and testamentary transfers to a spouse. I.R.C. §§ 2053, 2056 (Westlaw 2003). This
gives married taxpayers a way to escape transfer tax liability and allows married couples
to engage in non-tax estate planning without transfer tax consequences. See Knauer,
supra, at 173. But see supra note 7 for discussion of marriage penalty that affects some
married couples.
See also Dee Ann Habegger, Living in Sin and the Law: Benefits for Unmarried Couples
Dependent upon Sexual Orientation?, 33 IND. L. REv. 991,991-995 (2000); William V.
Vetter, Restrictions on Equal Treatment of Unmarried Domestic Partners, 5 B.U. Pus.
INT. L.J. I, 1-9 {1995); Christine Jax, Same-Sex Marriage- Why Not?, 4 WIDENER J.
PuB. L. 461, 463-465 ( 1995). See generally Unmarried America, Unmarried Americans

Question Unfairness in Federal Tax Laws, available at
http://www.unmarriedamerica.com/taxeslbrochure I.htm (last visited March 17, 2004),
(describing many of the same tax and social security benefits extended to married
ta¥ayers, but not to singles or same-sex or unmarried couples).
20
See supra note 20 1.
203 This benefit results from the effective splitting of income between the spouses.
The individual wage earner's income is thus taxed at a lower rate. The caretaking and
domestic services provided by the stay-at-home spouse, moreover, go untaxed. See, e.g.,
Mrujorie Kornhauser, Love, Money and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint
Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63,64 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and
the Family : A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv.
983,988-\034 (\992) (surveying the relevant tax laws and the behavioral incentives the
foster within marriages); Michael J. Mcintyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family
in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1627 {1977)
(comparing joint- and single-return tax burdens on family income).
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families arguably receive significant net benefits by marrying, the socalled traditional family is rewarded further. Society also privileges and
supports marital families in numerous direct and indirect ways. 204
Across the United States, unmarried men and women who live
together are almost as likely to be raising children as are married
couples. 205 But because they have chosen not to formalize their
relationships, they must manage caretaking without many of the benefits
accorded marital families.
Also, social support for single-parent
families, the vast majority of which are headed by women, can vary
dramatically based on the way in which those families were originally
formed. Widows, for example, typically received generous and nonstigmatized social security benefits.Z06 Divorced and never-married
mothers must depend instead on the vicissitudes of the uncertain child
support207 and welfare systems. 208 Not only are these families affected
materially, but they also suffer from a social stigma that is reinforced by
the existing legal structure.
Some commentators retort that two-parent marital families are best
for children, so it is therefore appropriate for the state to subsidize or
privilege this family form over others. 209 There are several problems
204
205

See FINEMAN, supra note 32, at 226.

Forty-three percent of unmarried, cohabiting couples are raising children, just
slightly less than the 46 percent of married couples raising children. And while the trend
is rising for unmarried couples, it is becoming less common for married couples to have
children living with them. D'Vera Cohn, Live-Ins Almost as Likely as Marrieds to be
Parents; Census Also Looks at Gay Households. WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2003, at A I.
206 The surviving spouse of an insured worker caring for a child under 16 may receive
75 percent of the amount the worker would have received had he or she retired. Once
the surviving spouse turns 60, he or she may receive I 00 percent of the amount the
worker would have received through the Social Security system. See Mary E.
O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking the Link Between Wages and Benefits, 61 TUL. L.
REv. I42I, I48I (1993).
207 Just over half of eligible caretakers receive orders of support;most of them are
divorced mothers. A significant proportion of those who have such orders do not receive
payments or only receive partial payments. See Irwin Garfinkel & Patrick Wong, Child
Support and Public Policy, in LONE-PARENT FAMILIES: THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE IOl,
I02-03 (Elizabeth Duskin ed., I990).
208 Most states provide welfare benefits (combining cash benefits, Medicaid and food
stamps) that add up to only 70 percent of the federal poverty level. Yet a minimum wage
job is insufficient to replace welfare benefits and involves associated expenses
(transportation, clothing, etc.). See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, 636-37 (Comm. Print 1992).
209 See. e.g.. William Galston, The Reinstitutionalization of Marriage: Political
Theory and Public Policy, in PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE
IN AMERJCA 27I, 272-276, 282-289 (David Popenoe et al. eds., 1996) (discussing the
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with this argument. First, the empirical data is often more complicated
than these advocates suggest.
Well-regarded sociologist Sara
McLanahan210 has found that data does not support the conclusion that
what harms children is the absence of one parent. Instead, McLanahan
says, single parenting currently leads to certain types of instability that
can harm children.211 Much of the link between single parenting and
negative child outcomes can thus be attributed to low income, less-stable
adult presence, and residential mobility after divorce. Other researchers
have conducted subsequent studies that have refined McLanahan's
findings further; these studies suggest that a decline in parenting begins
pre-divorce in intact, but conflicted families, and may continue for a
period of time post-divorce. 212 Other commentators, moreover, have
highlighted the danger in isolating a single variable to identify the cause
of social phenomena. 21 3 Single parenthood, for example, is not evenly
distributed across society, but instead correlates with other
socioeconomic factors. It is therefore difficult to pinpoint the effects of
single parenthood on children. 214
civic functions performed by the two-parent family, as well as the economic, cultural and
legal factors necessary to foster and encourage that species of familial organization). See
generally David Blankenhorn, FATifERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT
SOCIAL PROBLEM 1-5 (1995) (describing "fatherlessness" as the most harmful
demographic trend confronting the current generation).
210 See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Accounting for Family Change, 89 GEO. L.J. 923, 942
~2001).

II See SARA S. MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE
PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 3-4 (1994). For example, other studies have found
compelling evidence that a father's absence harms children because of the reduced
income to the household. See, e.g., URBAN INSTITUTE, CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELLBEING 1 (I. Garfinkel, S.S. McLanahan, & P.K. Robins eds., 1994). Findings on other
ways in which paternal absence may harm children have been much Jess definitive. See,
e.g., Paul R. Amato & Joan G. Gilbreth, Nonresident Fathers and Children's Well-being:
A Meta-Analysis, 61 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAMILY 557, 557-73 (1999); Valerie King,

Variation in the Consequences of Nonresident Father Involvement for Children's WellBeing, 56 J. OF MARRIAGE & FAMILY 963, 963-72 (1994). See generally Suzanne M .
Bianchi, Maternal Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic Change or Surprising
Continuity?, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 401 (2000).
212 See, e.g., PAUL R . AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK 71-73 (1997);
cf Andrew Cherlin et. al., Effects of Parental Divorce on Mental Health Through the
L{{e Course, 63 AM. Soc. REv. 239,239-40 (1998).
2 3 See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 19, at 111-122 (surveying contemporary research).
Carbone notes that nonmarital births occur disproportionately among those already
disadvantaged by income and race. See id. at ll9.
214 See, e.g., id. at 80-84. Those who are single parents tend to come from groups
already disadvantaged economically and in other ways (age, race, etc.). !d. at 119-122.
Furthermore, poverty negatively affects parents' psychological well-being and the
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The bottom line is that the data supporting arguments that twoparent families are inherently superior to others is not overwhelming.
Moreover, even if children derive some benefits from being reared in
two-parent families, privileging those families is the wrong
governmental response for several reasons. First, it is not at all clear that
the marginal benefits to children from living in two-parent families
outweigh the intrusion into adults' private intimate lives wrought by promarriage policies. Second, prior to resorting to such intrusions, the state
should attempt to neutralize any disadvantages of the single-parent
household by implementing programs that directly support caretaking
efforts.
Another consideration is that policies that privilege marital families
over others ignore some of the negative consequences that the traditional
family form has had on many women. Within most families, women do
the lion's share of the caretaking work, whether they work outside the
home or not. 215 Childrearing has been viewed as a female occupation
since the mid-nineteenth century.216 While much of the overt rhetoric of
domesticity and of the separate spheres of home and market has faded,
the idealization of the mother-child bond continues.
Pregnancy,
childbearing, and nursing are biological functions that may be
distinguished from childrearing. But their mystification helps perpetuate
what some argue is a stubborn dual myth: women are 'naturally' suited
for caretaking or childrearing, while men are not. 217
Lifelong
socialization and explicit external influences have together pressured
parent-child relationship. For example, poverty is associated with greater parental
anxiety, emotional stress, and harsher and more inconsistent punishment of children. See
Nancy E. Dowd, Stigmatizing Single Parents, 18 Harv. Women's L.J. 19, 32-34 (1995).
215 Studies comparing the amount of time that men and women spend parenting
consistently show that women perform more hours of childcare than men, although the
data conflict on how large the differential actually is. For analysis and discussion of the
data, see Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for
Egalitarian Marriage? 84 VA. L. REv. 509, 519-24 (1998). In addition, men take less
parental leave from the workplace (even when flexible work and leave policies are
available and men are equally entitled to take leave to care for family members) to spend
time with their families. ARLIE R. HOCHSCHILD, THE TiME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES
HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK 131 (1997). It remains the case that women are much
more likely than men to interrupt their work to care for children. See Naomi Cahn, The
Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISIM 177, 185-86 (2000). See also Bianchi,
supra note 211; Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental
Ef{,uality, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1415 (1991).
21
See Cahn, supra note 215, at 189.
217 See, e.g., !d. at 198 (arguing that because women's only dominion has historically
been over children, they have become associated with this power).
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mothers to shoulder a disproportionate share of the burdens (as well as
receive a disproportionate share of the joys and benefits) of childrearing.
For example, despite data suggesting that children in good daycare
thrive, a majority of people polled believe nonetheless that preschoolaged children suffer when their mothers work outside the home. 218 In
part because this idealized caretaking structure presumes a male primary
breadwinner to financially support the household, its continued support
by government perpetuates patriarchal familial norms.
As discussed elsewhere in this Article, there are compelling reasons
for the state to refrain from intervening in or distorting the expressive,
companionate, and sexual/procreative aspects of adults' intimate
choices. 219 The nature of the public interest in dependent caretaking,
however, is quite distinct. Given society's overwhelming interest in the
well-being and development of all child dependents, a better policy than
one that promotes marriage is one that directly supports all children.
Since we should value all children equally, it is irrational for policies to
privilege some and stigmatize others based on the structure of the family
in which they are raised. We must take public responsibility for
ensuring caretaking, and this responsibility does require government
intervention.

"For Richer, For Poorer": The Economic Function ofMarriage

E.

In addition to being a relationship premised on affection and
emotional commitment between partners, marriage is also an economic
institution. Marriages are the locus for economic support of dependents
in what is can be seen as a privatized system of wealth redistribution.
The family's caretaking and economic functions are thus closely related.
Economic support is essential to caretaking; the economic well-being of
all its child dependents, therefore, should be of primary concern to the
state.
The normative modern marriage is an economic partnership built on
sharing principles. 220 The couple jointly makes investment decisions in
career assets and human capital that ultimately benefit the marital family

218

See DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, BALANCING AcT: MOTHERHOOD,
MARRIAGE, AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN 182-83 (1996).
219
ee supra Parts liLA., III.B., and III.C.
220 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 15-37 (1981) (first raising

s

the economic model of the division oflabor in the two-spouse family).
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as a whole. 221 In its most conventional manifestation, of course, the
economic vision of marriage is one in which the husband earns a wage
outside the home that is sufficient to support himself, his wife (who does
not earn a wage outside the home), and their children. 222 Gary Becker
and other economists have attempted to justify this model of marriage by
arguing that positive efficiencies result from this sort of specialization of
labor. 223
The normative vision of the economic function of marriage in the
U.S. can be traced to the colonial period. American colonists brought
with them from England marital and property systems that were feudal
in origin.224 English marriage law, consistent with property rules,
treated married couples as a single legal entity; under the doctrine of
coverture, a woman ceased to exist as a distinct legal person upon
marrying and her legal persona became subsumed into that of her
husband. 225 The legal unity of husband and wife suited early American
221

See Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 61 N.C. L. REv. 1103,
1115 (1989). Much economic analysis examines family life as a process of exchange.
Exchange theory preswnes that members of a household will interact the way that
strangers do in the marketplace-contracting around allocations of resources, negotiating
and making deals to increase one's own personal utility or happiness. Yet economists
have begun to examine the role of altruism, considered a distinctive characteristic of
family economic behavior. Nonetheless, while altruism complicates models of exchange
within the family, Ann Estin argues that it does not replace the exchange theory of
behavior, which is ultimately rational and self-interested. See Ann Laquer Estin, Love
and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv.
989, 1013-1016 (1995).
222
See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text
223 See discussion supra, Part ll.A., and text accompanying notes 18-30. June
Carbone has suggested that Becker's theories be updated to reflect the fact that women's
workforce participation actually leads to greater specialization among women.
CARBONE, supra note 102, at 16, 17. This specialization not only increases overall
wealth but also may give women greater ability to choose family forms, including more
egalitarian marriages or no marriage at all.
2Z4 These systems arose from the need in thirteenth-century feudal England to keep
landed estates intact under the authority of a single member of the next generation. See
generally Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 1135
(discussing interpretations of nineteenth-century family history); See also Charles
Donohue, What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital Property in England and
France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L. REv. 59, 60 (1979).
225
Unmarried women had limited rights of inheritance and could not vote, serve on
juries, or hold public office. They nonetheless had some legal capacity: women could
hold property, enter into contracts, and sue or be sued. However, upon marrying, women
lost these privileges, and could no longer enter into contracts, sue or be sued, or make
wills. During their marriage, a woman's husband had legal authority to control his
wife's land and to use any profits accruing from the property. See Homer H. Clark, Jr.,
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agrarian society, as farming made marriage an economic enterprise in
which husband and wife were interdependent. 226 But while, married
couples lived and worked together, the husband was the undisputed head
of both the domestic and commercial spheres. This hierarchy was
justified both by the ideology of the inherent inferiority of women and
the economic reality of the husband's control of the family's incomeproducing assets. 227 Industrialization, the effects of which were being
felt in the eastern United States in the early part of the nineteenth
century, severed the commercial and domestic spheres and precipitated a
redefinition of gender roles. Men joined the sphere of the marketplace
and the factory, while women were assigned almost exclusively to the
domestic sphere. 228
During World War II, when large numbers of men were deployed
overseas, many women took up their places in factories across America.
The post-World War II years saw the end of the Industrial Age and the
beginning of a "post-industrial" economy, when the heavy
manufacturing and agricultural production that characterized
industrialism were displaced by service and light industry
employment.229 With men nearly fully employed, many middle-class
women supplied labor to meet the increased demand. 230 But even when
both the husband and wife worked outside the house, they typically
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 286-87 (2d. ed. 1988). See
also Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, I VA. J. Soc. PoL' Y & L. 383,
385-86 (1994); June R. Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist
Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REv. 953, 970 (1991)
(discussing the nineteenth-century legal reforms in the United States that altered the
conception of a married women's economic rights).
226 The family household as a whole-not the primary or exclusive wage-earner-was
the basic unit of economic production. ELI ZARETSKY, CAPITALISM, THE FAMILY, &
PERSONAL LIFE 28-29 (1976).
227 See ANTONIA FRASER, THE WEAKER VESSEL: WOMAN'S LOT IN SEVENTEENTHCENTURY ENGLAND 1-6 (1984); NANCY COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: 'WOMAN'S
SPHERE' IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835,201-04 (1977).
228 See Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497, 1499-1501 (1983). As of 1890, only five percent of
married women were employed outside the home. LYNN Y. WEINER, FROM WORKING
GIRL TO WORKING MOTHER 6 (1985).
229 See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 24-25 (1988);
MARY P. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA 313-331 (1975).
230 See FUCHS, supra at 15; Paula England & George Farkas, HOUSEHOLDS,
EMPLOYMENT, AND GENDER 137-45 (1986). June R. Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig,
Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65
TUL. L. REv. 953,972-74 (1991).
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assigned only one partner (usually the husband) to focus on the
workplace and maximize his income. 23 1 The second partner (usually the
wife) took primary responsibility for dependent caretaking and
subordinated her work obligations to meet the needs of her family and
children.232 Even today, most couples continue to give higher priority to
the husband's career, while women remain far more likely than men to
sacrifice their market potential in order to benefit their children and
families. 233 Research has shown that much of the pay gap between men
and women can be attributed to their different caregiving roles. 234 Joan
Williams has concluded that:
[t]he key gender shift between the domesticity/wage labor gender
system and the contemporary system is not ... a shift from dependent to
independent wives. Instead, the key shift is from wives totally cut off
from market resources to wives who are secondary workers with careers
subordinated to both their husbands' and their children's ... needs. 235
As their earning capacity decreases, many married women become
increasingly dependent on their husbands. Intact marriages can mask
this dependency. When marriages fail (as nearly half of all marriages
do), however, those women frequently must become primary earners in
an economy where a single wage-earner with few market skills
frequently cannot earn enough to support herself and two children.
Former husbands are often unwilling or unable to support two
households. 236 Thus, while nearly eighty percent of single mothers
work, their employment often does not translate into economic selfsufficiency. Barriers to single-parent families' economic well-being
include low wages and continuing job segregation,237 expensive child
care, and lack of employer-provided health insurance and other
benefits. 238 Many women and their children transfer their dependency
from their husbands and fathers (while marriages are intact) to the state
23 1
232
233
234
235

See Singer, supra note 221, at 1115.
!d.
See Singer, supra note 221, at 1115.
See HEYMANN, supra note 195, at 147-159.
Joan Williams, Women and Property, in
(Richard H. Chused, ed., 1992).
236

A

PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY

182, 184

STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITIEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 208, at 725.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WHO CARES FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN 26 (1990).
See also Smith, supra note 181, at 135 n. 62.
238 See Nancy E. Dowd, Family Values and Valuing Family: A Blueprint for Family
Leave, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 359-62 (1993).

237
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(after dissolution of their marriages). More than a third of all welfare
recipients are divorced mothers and their children. 239
Encouraging marriage is suggested as good economic policy240
based in part on statistics that demonstrate that married couples are less
likely to be poor than are single parents.241 It nearly goes without saying
that correlation does not necessarily imply causation, but some
researchers nonetheless tum the covariation of female-headed families
and poverty into a causal relationship by ignoring the other social forces
that contribute to this phenomenon. Marriage promotion measures fail
to address economic circumstances that result in poverty. Faced with
data that the U.S. has more poverty than any other major advanced
nation,242 rather than attempting to limit the number of children born to
women receiving aid, government should focus instead on addressing
the extreme income inequality and poverty in the country.243

239

Loprest & Zedlewski, supra note 176 at 3.
See, e.g.• Adam Thomas & Isabel Sawhill, For Richer or for Poorer: Marriage as
an Antipoverty Strategy, 21-4 ]. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 587, 597 {2002) {"[Our]
analyses suggest that policies designed to engender marriage among single parents could
have a considerable impact on child poverty."); Wade F. Hom, Wedding Bell Blues:
Marriage and Welfare Reform, 19-3 BROOKINGS REv. 39, 39-42 (2001) ("Why haven't
states made more progress in encouraging marriage as one way to reduce welfare
dependency?"); Galston, supra note 209, at 275 ("These data suggest that the best anti~overty program for America's children is a stable, intact family.").
41 See. e.g.• Norval D. Glenn et al.. Why Marriage Matters: Twenty-One Conclusions
fjom the Social Sciences, AM. EXPERIMENT Q., Spring 2002, at 34, 38.
242
See generally Paul Krugman, For Richer: How the Permissive Capitalism of the
Boom Destroyed American Equality, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 20, 2002, at 62.
Sweden, for example, has a per capita G.D.P. roughly comparable with that of
Mississippi. However, the poorest Swedish families with children-those in the lOth
percentile-have incomes that are 60 percent higher than their counterparts in the U.S.
I d. at 76. Further, the median Swedish family has a standard of living comparable with
that of median U.S. families. Krugman notes that "because so much of our national
income is concentrated in relatively few hands, large numbers of Americans are worse
off economically than their counterparts in other advanced countries." !d. America has
higher per capita income than other advanced countries, but Krugman holds that to be
primarily because our rich are much richer. I d. at 67.
See also. Edward N. Wolff, The Economic Status ofParents in Postwar America, 59, 81,
in TAKING PARENTING PUBLIC: THE CASE FOR A NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT (Hewlett,
Rankin, & West, eds. 2002) ("[l]n comparison with other advanced economies, the
United States has by far the highest poverty incidence among children after the effects of
~overnment transfer programs are accounted for.").
43 See Krugman supra note 242 at 67. In 1998, according to Krugman, the 13,000
richest families in the U.S. had nearly as much income as the 20 million poorest
households. !d. at 65.
240
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Government's efforts to have poor women marry men to help
support them presumes that there is a pool of marriageable (i.e.,
employed, financially stable) men available to them. 244 Studies have
shown, however, that even if they were to marry and work in the
marketplace, most poor women would remain poor or near-poor. 245 In
fact, marriage can actually reduce the well-being of low-income mothers
if a potential spouse cannot contribute to the economic viability of the
household. 246 Indeed, declining labor opportunities for low-skilled men
have mirrored decreases in marriage rates in low-income
communities. 247 In the words of one low-income woman:
[After the baby was bom,] everything started blowing up. I
didn't [want to] be with him no more 'cause he wasn't
working and he was getting on my nerves ... He just never
gave me no money. I would tell him, you know, 'Well, the
baby needs diapers.' 'Well, I don't have no money.' 'The
baby needs milk.' 'Well, I don't have no money.' I just
started getting mad. I had to buy milk and diapers so I just
told him to leave me alone. 248

244

But see Michael Tanner, Editorial, Wedded to Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003,
at A23. Tanner reports studies that have shown that there are relatively few
"marriageable" men in high-poverty areas of the country. One such study found that
more than one-third of fathers of nonmarital children lacked a high school degree; 28
percent were unemployed; 20 percent had annual incomes under $6,000; and roughly 38
percent had criminal records. Id. Tanner suggests that "many single mothers are single
because they fmd their unemployed and under-educated potential partners to be
unattractive marriage material. Do we really want to encourage them to marry
unsuitable partners?" Id.
245 See Wendy Sigle-Rushton and Sara McClanahan, For Richer or Poorer? Marriage
as an Anti-Poverty Strategy in the United States, 57 POPULATION 509, 509 (2003),
available at http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WPOl-17-FF-Sigle.pdf.
246 See Avis Jones-DeWeever, Marriage Promotion and Low-Income Communities:
An Examination of Real Needs and Real Solutions, INST. FOR WOMEN'S POL. REs. 2
(2002); Kathryn Edin, Few Good Men: Why Poor Women Don 't Remarry, THE
AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 3, 2000, at 262); Robin Jarrett, Welfare Stigma Among LowIncome, African American Single Mothers, 45 FAMILY RELATIONS 368-74 (1996).
247 See Francine D. Blau et al., Understanding Young Women 's Marriage Decisions:
The Role of Labor and Marriage Market Conditions, 53 INDUS. & LAB. RLTNS. REv. 624
~2000), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7510.pdf.
48 An African-American mother living in the Philadelphia metropolitan area,
interview excerpted in Edin, supra note 246.
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It is not at all certain that marriage is the antidote to poverty for
many families. 249 Moreover, the state's focus on marriage as the
ultimate solution permits society, at least to a degree, to comfortably
blame poverty on the poor-specifically poor unmarried women. The
focus on the red herring of marriage creates a culture of decreasing
public responsibility and diverts attention from the state's failures in
helping to ensure that dependents are cared for. Rather than focusing
attention of marriage as the solution, what is needed are programs that
lessen some of the most significant barriers to families' economic wellbeing.250

CONCLUSION
Dependent caretaking is critical to the development of an educated,
productive populace. Economic support and well-being is essential to
dependent caretaking. The public interest in those functions-as they
are performed both within and outside of marriage-therefore compels
some degree of government involvement. However, using marriage as a
proxy for these two, closely related functions is ham-handed.
Regulating marriage means regulating areas in which the state should
remain uninvolved-namely, the expressive, companionate, and sexual
and procreative aspects of the marital and other intimate relationships.
Rather than emphasizing the importance of marriage, government should
instead enact more carefully targeted policies to support caretaking and
the economic well-being of its citizenry.
249 See, e.g., Alex Kotlowitz, Editorial, It Takes a Wedding, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2002, at A29. In an anecdotal report, Kotlowitz writes about eight unmarried couples
who lived in public housing in Chicago. The couples were offered all-expenses-paid
weddings and honeymoons. Most of the couples subsequently split up. Kotlowitz
writes:
The stress of not having money, of living in decrepit housing, of sending
children to poorly funded schools would take its toll on even the most
committed relationship. So how then might we help get couples to the
altar? By pushing marriage? Or by helping ease the strains in people's
lives?
/d.

250 Studies have shown that mothers' increased market work has not decreased the
quality, and perhaps not even the quantity, of time women spend with their children. See
Suzanne M. Bianchi, Maternal Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic Change
or Surprising Continuity? 37 DEMOGRAPHY, 40l, 403 (2000). Bianchi argues that we
have overestimated the amount of maternal time spent with children in the past and
failed to appreciate how much working mothers do to protect the time spent with
children. /d.
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What would this look like in practice? First, the state would
deemphasize family form. It would eliminate government-sanctioned
privileges that currently accompany heterosexual monogamous marriage
and that devalue and stigmatize other family structures. It would also
introduce programs that directly bolster dependent caretaking and the
economic supports that make such caretaking possible. Of course, some
ofthese programs would be costly. Yet it is lack of political will, rather
than economic inability, that currently prevents these programs from
being adopted in the U.S. 251 Possible programs could include subsidized
or public day care, longer school days and school years, more affordable
health care, 252 and workplace protections (including paid family leave
policies and flexible schedules253). To further ensure the economic
security of dependents, the state should also make modifications to the
welfare, social security, and tax systems.
These could include
combining the welfare and social security systems into a single system
that ensures that dependents and their caretakers receive an level of
support and increasing child tax credits for caretakers.254 In reviewing
these proposals, it should be kept in mind that while they may sound

251

Matthew Miller, a former budget aide in the Clinton White House, has recently
proposed that government devote 2% of the U.S. gross domestic product, approximately
$220 billion, to alleviate some of the country's most entrenched social problems. Miller
suggests reprioritizing budget expenditures to provide universal health coverage,
stabilize the Social Security system, better fund public education systems in inner cities,
and ensure a living wage for the working poor. MATIHEW MILLER, THE Two PERCENT
SOLUTION: FIXING AMERICA'S PROBLEMS IN WAYS THAT LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES
CAN LOVE ix-xv, 69-219 (2003). I note Miller's proposal to illustrate the potential
economic feasibility of even ambitious social programs.
252 See, e.g., Ted Halstead, Editorial, To Guarantee Universal Coverage, Require It,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A29. Halstead proposes that the federal government
implement mandatory self-insurance to provide fully portable coverage to all Americans.
Those who could not afford to self-insure would be subsidized, and the separate
Medicaid system for those who are poor would be eliminated. Halstead argues that such
a system would lower insurance costs, raise the quality of care, maintain a private
insurance market, and offer citizens more choice. !d.
253 Studies in other countries have shown that leave policies covering childbirth and
infant care significantly increase mothers' return to work. See Marit Ronsen & Marianne
Sundstrom, Marital Employment in Scandinavia: A Comparison of the After-Birth
Employment Activity of Norwegian and Swedish Women, 9 J. OF POPULATION
ECONOMICS 267 (1996) (finding the right to paid maternity leave, coupled with job
security, accelerated the return to work for Norwegian and Swedish mothers).
254 See, e.g., William A. Galston, Public Morality and Public Policy: The Case of
Children and Family Policy, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 313, 318-10 (1996) (discussing
Clinton administration proposals to increase the per child tax credit).
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dramatic and interventionist, they have been implemented successfully
in countries less wealthy than ours. 255
Some might suggest that it is incongruous to demand privacy from
government intervention in certain aspects of family life but seek its
intervention in other aspects. But incongruity appears only if the marital
family is viewed as an indivisible unit. Dissecting that unit into its
functional parts brings into sharp relief and permits examination of its
different components. Once family life has been dissected, the question
becomes not how one can justify treating certain aspects of the family
differently, but instead how one can justify treating such radically
different aspects of the family the same. Why should government
privilege marriage as an exclusive instrument of expression (especially
when the content of that expression is largely predetermined)? Why
should it privilege one form of companionate relationship over others
that may serve the same societal functions? Why should sexual and
procreative freedom be contingent either upon one's marital or
economic status? Why shouldn't the state do more to provide economic
support for caretaking-the aspect of family functioning most crucial to
its own future well-being?256
Some modem family theorists ignore the power of current norms in
shaping majoritarian views of and preferences for what is deemed
"natural." With respect to the family, "natural" has come to refer to
Westernized ideals of intimate commitment that have stamped out or
obscured alternative family practices seen in much of the world. 257
255

See Krugman, supra note 242; Wolff, supra note 242.
Arguably, one of the current benefits of marriage is that it puts in place a system of
default rules which apply in the event of its dissolution. These default rules attempt to
recognize that marriages frequently involve joint determinations that affect the financial
positions of the spouses upon divorce. Couples can sometimes contract out through
prenuptial agreements, but are generally bound by the property division systems of their
jurisdictions. De-privileging marriage in law would require a new system-one that
centers not on a particular status, but instead on those functions that we care about. This
system might have broader application than the current one and is a topic for continued
thought and discussion.
257 In her history of marriage in the United States, Nancy Cott notes that during the
colonial period:
Christian common sense took for granted the rightness of monogamous
marriage ... Learned knowledge deemed monogamy a God-given but also
a civilized practice, a natural right that stemmed from a subterranean basis
in natural law. Yet at that time, Christian monogamists composed a
minority in the world ... Most of the peoples and cultures around the
globe ... held no brief for strict monogamy. The belief systems of Asia,
256
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Those who embrace these ideals elide other possible manifestations of
intimate relationships, lifelong and otherwise, that have the potential for
individual realization and also fulfill the socially useful caretaking and
support functions.
Because of the current maelstrom surrounding the issue of gay
marriage, it is worth noting that the Article has clear implications on
how it should be treated. Again, there are aspects of family life whose
boundaries the state ought to respect, and there are aspects whose
societal importance calls for state support. Since gay families and socalled traditional families are identical with respect to these aspects, it is
both foolhardy and counterproductive for the state to treat gay families
any differently.
Majority American culture has not only rejected alternative family
forms, it has labeled them "unnatural" and in some cases, even unlawful.
Too much of what seems to underlie these arguments is a belief that
lifelong marital commitment is a good and moral thing. But we must
beware of"public morality" arguments in "public welfare" clothes.
Put simply, the approach suggested in this Article promotes the
public welfare. It safeguards individual liberty, advances gender
equality, and protects the well-being of children and other dependents.
It is not anti-marriage. 258 It is pro-family.

Africa, and Australia, of the Moslems around the Mediterranean, and the
natives of North and South America all countenanced polygamy and other
complex marriage practices ....
Con, PUBLIC Vows, supra note 78, at 9-10.
258 Eliminating public consequences of marriage would not preclude couples from
marrying in private ceremonies. Individuals should remain free to marry, and religious
and other organizations can define and solemnize marriages however they see fit.

